Printing (2024)

Response

In the first instance, please note that while the House of Commons and the House of Lords are two separate public authorities for the purposes of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA), the information you have requested is in general the responsibility of the Parliamentary Digital Service (PDS), which is a joint, bicameral service which is used by both Houses. Some questions however also relate to the work of teams solely within the House of Commons. Some parts of this response therefore covers both Houses of Parliament while others only cover the House of Commons, and where this is the case it will be specified.

1. Number of MFDs (Multi-functional devices) & photocopiers at House of Commons / House of Lords.

Some information is held by the House of Commons. We hold a record of 137 multi-functional devices (MFDs) which are linked to the parliamentary IT network. These devices allow a user to photocopy, scan, email and print documents from anywhere on the parliamentary estate.

We do not hold information about any older, stand-alone photocopiers that our teams may have retained prior to the introduction of MFDs.

We also do not hold information about any photocopiers in the offices of MPs and/or their staff, even if they are on the parliamentary estate. This is because MPs (who are not employed by the House of Commons and are similar in status to self-employed people) are responsible for acquiring their own office equipment.

However, to be helpful, MPs may claim expenses for office equipment, and these expenses are paid by the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority (IPSA). It is therefore possible that IPSA may hold details of photocopiers purchased by Members and claimed on expenses. If you wish to contact them for that information, their contact details can be found on the IPSA website.

2. Name of incumbent.

This information is held by the House. The current incumbent for the House of Commons’ MFDs is Specialist Computer Centres PLC.

3. Start/end date of contract (if expired, WHEN do you expect to revisit the marketplace).

This information is held by the House. This contract started on 31 January 2024 and is due to end on 31 January 2027.

4. Details of any extension options.

This information is held by the House. There is an option of two twelve-month extensions, totalling two years if formally executed up to 31 January 2029.

5. What framework / Route to market used.

This information is held by the House. The Crown Commercial Services framework RM6174: Multifunctional Devices (MFDs), Print and Digital Workflow Software Services and Managed Print Service Provision was used for this procurement.

6. Number of regular/desktop printers (in addition to above).

We hold a record that the House of Commons has 639 printers connected to the parliamentary network, in addition to the MFDs detailed above.

7. Is there a support contract on above, if yes please state start/end date.

This information is held by the House. The support contract started on 31 January 2024 and is scheduled to end on 31 January 2027.

8. Do you have a Print Room.

This information is held by the House. Yes, a House of Commons based team provides printing services for the House of Commons and for Parliamentary Digital Services. Although, the print room is not officially a bicameral service, it does offer chargeable printing to the House of Lords and some other parliamentary bodies such as the commonwealth parliamentary association or the British-Irish inter-parliamentary union. The figures below include those additional printing jobs and cannot be disaggregated.

9. If yes, name of supplier, number of devices and start/end date of contract, also details of any extension options.

This information is held by the House. The supplier of equipment to our in-house printing services team is Canon. There are 13 devices used, and the contract runs from 1 June 2022 to 1 June 2027. This includes an option to extend the contract until 1 June 2029.

10. Total annual print/copy volumes including, if applicable your Print Room, for (a) mono (b) colour.

This information is held by the House. As stated above, the below figures include the additional printing jobs for the House of Lords and other parliamentary bodies and cannot be disaggregated.

Between 1 April 2023 and the date of your request on 22 March 2024, the total volumes were 8,415,433 for mono printing and 4,574,406 for colour printing.

11. What Print software do you run.

This information is held by the House. We use Uniflow print software.

We also use another print software, the details of which are withheld in accordance with sections 24 and 31 FOIA. Details of these exemptions are provided below.

Section 24(1) – National security

Parliament is an extremely high profile organisation, and the parliamentary estate would be a very desirable target for terrorists and other malicious actors. We are very aware of the increased threats from organisations and individuals seeking to disrupt the workings of government and the UK’s democratic institutions. In order to safeguard national security, some information relating to our network, including software, is exempt from disclosure under s.24(1) FOIA. This is a qualified exemption and the public interest test is detailed below.

We have considered the public interest in disclosing this information.
• Disclosing information about our network and software may increase public awareness of how the House of Commons operates and would reassure the public that our technology owned by the House is only being used in a manner which is both secure and appropriate to the work of the House.
• As software licences are publicly funded, there is a public interest in being able to scrutinise the software and that its use is fit for purpose.

We have considered the public interest in maintaining the exemption.
• Parliament’s security is defined as part of the Critical National Infrastructure (CNI), which constantly faces threats from malicious and terrorist groups looking to compromise areas of weakness within the infrastructure.
• As stated above, the release of information about some of our software, would allow these malicious groups and actors to gain a greater understanding of systems. This would make the infrastructure more vulnerable to attack, particularly if this information exposed potential weaknesses within our cyber security processes.
• By disclosing details of some software those parties wishing to cause harm or disruption are better placed to understand our infrastructure and co-ordinate attacks, either by corrupting or hacking the software.
• Any successful attack against the CNI would also be likely to compromise national cyber security by allowing these groups to gain unauthorised access to highly confidential or sensitive information, either through malware, phishing attacks, SQL injections, etc..
• The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) advises that it is the nature and level of potential harm which should be considered for a section 24 exemption, “even if the chance of that harm occurring is relatively low” and as the release of this information has the potential to compromise national security, the public interest favours withholding the information in this instance.

For these reasons, we have concluded that the public interest in withholding the information outweighs the public interest in disclosure.

Section 31(1)(a) and (b) – Law enforcement

Terrorism and cybercrimes remain a constant threat to public authorities, and we consider that disclosing information about this software would prejudice the prevention and detection of crime and also the apprehension and prosecution of offenders. This information is therefore exempt under sections 31(1)(a) and (b) FOIA. This is a qualified exemption and the public interest test applies, as detailed below.

We have considered the public interest in disclosing this information.
• We recognise there is a legitimate public interest in the House of Commons being open, transparent and accountable about how it uses software
• As software is financed via the public purse, there is a public interest in being able to scrutinise it’s usage, and to ensure that it is fit for purpose and cost-effective.
• As cited above, disclosing this information may increase public awareness of how the House of Commons operates, and again would reassure the public that technology owned by the House is only being used in a manner which is both secure and appropriate to the work of the House.

We have considered the public interest in maintaining the exemption.
• The parliamentary security infrastructure remains constantly under threat by malicious individuals and groups seeking to attack it for their own criminal purposes.
• The disclosure of information about this software would provide at least some insight into the size and scope of our cyber security and processes, and would be likely to allow criminals to more effectively target and counteract these processes.
• This would increase the likelihood of the House being exposed to criminal actions including, but not limited to, hacking or corrupting software with the intention of data or processes theft using Phishing, viruses, SQL injections and Malware.
• This information could be used in conjunction with other information - in subsequent requests, the public domain or obtained elsewhere - in order to build an even more complete picture of our systems and processes. This is known as a mosaic effect. For instance, this information could be cross-referenced with other data sets to obtain a wider overview of our equipment and security processes, in particular how effective they are. From this information, criminals would be able to identify any vulnerabilities present in these processes, which again would further aid their chances of countering them.
• The release of this information would therefore aid criminals and other malicious groups in targeting the parliamentary security network, the CNI and undermining our cyber security processes, in turn increasing the chance of a successful attack against the parliamentary estate and prejudicing the prevention of crime as a result.

In these circumstances it is therefore our view that the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information.

12. Your total annual spend on print.

This information is held by the House. We have interpreted your question to be about the financial year 2023/24, up to and including 22 March 2024.

The total spend on print by the House of Commons is £600,981, which includes costs for paper, equipment, device rentals, software and click charges, which are the price per printed copy that we pay to the company from whom we lease the copiers. As stated in question 8, this includes chargeable print jobs for the House of Lords and other parliamentary bodies which cannot be disaggregated.