Hardware (2023)

Response

In the first instance, please note that while the House of Commons and the House of Lords are two separate public authorities for the purposes of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA), the information you have requested is in general the responsibility of the Parliamentary Digital Service (PDS), which is a joint, bicameral service which is used by both Houses. Some questions however also relate to the work of teams solely within the House of Commons. Some parts of this response therefore covers both Houses of Parliament while others only cover the House of Commons, and where this is the case it will be specified.

1a) Please state the number of printing devices currently in use within the Service; including MFDs, single function printers, photocopiers and print room devices

This information is held by the House of Commons.

At the time of your request, there are 1,815 printers used by both Houses of Parliament and 137 MFDs in use specifically by the House of Commons. There are also 13 production print room devices in use by the House of Commons.

1b) how long these agreements are for in years and when the next review will be?
8) What is the length of the MFD, stand alone printers and print room device contracts in place, and can you confirm these are Financial Operating agreements?
and
9) What are the start and end dates for all printers/MFDs/Print room contracts within your organisation?

This information is held by the House of Commons.

Our printers contract forms part of a much wider End User Hardware contract for laptops, monitors and PCs, and is in place for 3 years total with an optional extension for two years (1+1). Its start date is 9 February 2021 and the end date is 9 February 2024, which is when it will also be reviewed.

Our MFD operating lease contract is place for six months with an optional extension of 1 year (6+6 months). Its start date is 1 April 2023 and its end date is 30 September 2023, which is when it will also be reviewed.

Our agreements for production print room devices are in place for five years. The contract start date was May 2022, and the end date is October 2027, which is also when it will be reviewed.

We hold no information about “Financial Operating Agreements”.

2a) What percentage of your fleet of MFds/printers is in colour vs mono and;

The House of Commons holds information on the percentage of our printers, MFDs and production print room devices which are in colour or mono (Table 1) (csv, 1KB).
Please note that we only hold the percentage for printers in mono and colour for both Houses, and this cannot be disaggregated:

b) What are the models in use?

While this information is held by the House of Commons, it is exempt in accordance with sections 24 & 31 FOIA. Details of these exemptions are provided below:

Section 24 – National Security

Details on specific models of equipment used is exempt by virtue of section 24(1) FOIA because this is necessary to prevent prejudice to national security. This is a qualified exemption and the public interest test applies.

We have considered the public interest in disclosing this information. As equipment used by the House is publicly funded, there is an innate public interest in being transparent about the full details of any equipment used. Releasing this information would support transparency, as well as providing accountability. Furthermore, as this equipment has been financed from the public purse, we accept that it is also in the public interest to be able to scrutinise details of the exact models purchased to ensure that they are sensible, cost-effective and fit for purpose.

However, we have also considered the public interest in withholding this information. Our printing equipment accesses and uses the Parliamentary Network, which forms part of the Critical National Infrastructure and has been identified as an asset which faces a high level of threat from cyber-attacks. If breached, it would cause damage to the national interest. The network is used by passholders across the House, including MPs and their staff, as well as MPs in their capacity as Ministers, for the purposes of communication, scrutinising the work of the government and also in their parliamentary functions. Providing detailed information on specific models of printing equipment used however would make it significantly easier for cyber attackers to target our equipment and the parliamentary network as a whole. Furthermore, if any information arises regarding flaws or vulnerabilities specific to this equipment, this could be used in combination to more easily target it (also known as a mosaic effect), significantly increasing the chance of a cyber-attack.

Any breach of the network could enable access to sensitive information such as MPs’ constituency data or classified material, and could affect the ability of the House to carry out its business properly. It could also expose individuals to criminal activities, who are linked through their work to government departments or other branches of the state, compromising national security as a result. This information has the potential to compromise the fundamental systems of the House and by extension the functioning of government departments, rendering them potentially vulnerable to cyber security and terroristic threats. For these reasons, we have concluded that the public interest in withholding the information outweighs the public interest in disclosure.

Section 31 – Law Enforcement

We also consider that disclosing the same information would be likely to prejudice the prevention or detection of crime and the apprehension of offenders. This information is therefore also exempt by virtue of section 31(1)(a) and (b) FOIA. This is a qualified exemption and the public interest test applies.

We have considered the public interest in disclosing this information. As stated before, there is a general public interest in transparency and accountability regarding this information. IT equipment used by the House is publicly funded, and there is an interest in informing the public of the exact equipment used. Furthermore, as these systems have been financed from the public purse, we accept that it is also in the public interest to be able to scrutinise any equipment purchased by the House of Commons in order to ensure that purchases made were sensible, cost-effective and fit for purpose.

We have also considered the public interest in withholding this information. As stated before, the release of this information could potentially be used, along with other public information, in order to launch criminal cyber-attacks against both the devices as well as the parliamentary network by extension. The House faces persistent cyber threats, and restricting the release of security sensitive information is therefore necessary in order to mitigate these threats. Releasing details of the device models would be likely to provide a significant advantage to malicious groups and individuals. This is because it would significantly increase their ability to launch cyber-attacks against these devices directly, particularly if any flaws/issues regarding these systems became public knowledge (usually known as the mosaic effect). If hackers were able to access our systems or devices , either in part or in full, they would then be able to hold these to ransom in order to extort them for financial gain, or to steal confidential information for the same purpose. Groups such as these are known to indiscriminately target public authorities for disruption and profit, and disclosing this information therefore carries this risk. The release of this information would therefore hinder the prevention and detection of crime as it would provide an advantage to cyber attackers looking to target the House, in turn providing them an advantage which they would not gain were this information withheld from release instead. In these circumstances therefore, it is our view that the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information.

3) In terms of usage, what is your monthly page volumes for both mono & colour?

Some information is held by the House of Commons. For our MFDs, the monthly page volume for mono is 157,789 pages, and for colour it is 145,991 pages.

Table 2 shows monthly usage levels for production printers from April 2022 to March 2023 in A3 printed sides (csv, 1KB), which is how we record the information.

4) Who are the main manufacturers or resellers for the MFDs/photocopiers/printers/Print production devices in use at the service?

This information is held by the House of Commons. The main manufacturers of our printers, production print room devices and MFDs are HP, Canon, Dell, OCE, Konica Minolta, Sharp, Epson, Ecosys, Varioprint and Ricoh.

5) Who are the main supplier(s) of printer consumables (Toner, spares, etc)?

This information is held by the House of Commons. The main suppliers of printer consumables to the House of Commons are Banner, XMA, Canon and SCC DS.

6a) Who is your preferred channel partner, if any for supply of PCs and laptops

This information is held by the House of Commons. We do not have a “preferred channel partner” for the supply of PCs and laptops in the way you have specified.

b) how many of each does the service currently have in use

This information is held by the House of Commons. We have 5,744 laptops and 2,131 tablets currently in use.

c) when do you expect to review any of these to be replaced?

This information is not held by the House of Commons at the time of your request.

7) What is the approximate spend on printers, photocopying agreements, rental or lease agreement and/or rentals and service charges during the last financial year?

Some information is held by the House of Commons. We hold the approximate annual spend for MFDs for the contract we have currently is in place, and this is £194,470 inc. VAT in total. We also hold total spend for our production print room equipment for the last financial year, and this was £333,663 inc VAT.

While we do not hold this information in the same way for printers, we do hold an approximate annual spend for the last 12 months for desktop printing hardware, and to be helpful we can disclose that this was £60,793 exc. VAT in total.

10a) Which procurement route or framework was used to procure this solution and

This information is held by the House of Commons. Our frameworks for these solutions (Table 3) (csv, 1KB)

b) What Framework would the service expect to use next?

This information is not held by the House of Commons. We do not hold a record of which frameworks we intend to use next when reprocuring printers, MFDs, and production print room devices.

11) The named person and their role in your organisation who is in charge of the procurement for printing and any managed print or IT contracts?

This information is held by the House of Commons. For printers, the person in charge of procuring printers for Parliament is the Head of Provisioning in PDS, while the person charge of procuring MFDs is the Head of Device Management.

While we hold the names of these individuals, this is their personal data and is therefore exempt from disclosure in accordance with section 40(2) FOIA. This is because we have concluded that the disclosure of this information would not be consistent with the data protection principle found in Article 5.1(a) of the UK General Data Protection Regulation (UK GDPR). This is an absolute exemption and the public interest test does not apply.

12) Does the service use any Print Management software, if yes, please confirm the product name, who supplies it and when does the current contract or licencing end?

This information is held by the House of Commons.

We use uniFLOW, which is supplied by SCC DS. Our contract with them ends in September 2023, however, we have an optional 6 month + 6 month extension clause with them which will be reviewed at that time. We also use EFI Market Direct Storefront for our production print room devices. This is supplied through Canon, and our contract with them ends in March 2027.

13a) Who supplies your current CCTV services across the Service
and
b) when will you next review

This information is held by the House of Commons. We hold information on who supplies CCTV Services to the House. While we hold this information however, it is withheld in accordance with sections 24, 31 and 38 FOIA. Details on these exemptions are provided below.

Section 24 – National security

Disclosing the supplier of our CCTV services would provide extensive details into the security measures used by Parliament, and withholding this is necessary for the purpose of safeguarding national security. This information is therefore exempt by virtue of section 24(1) FOIA. This is a qualified exemption and the public interest test applies.

We have considered the public interest in disclosing this information. The House of Commons is a vital part of UK politics and interacts on a daily basis with a number of important institutions, including the UK Government. Members of HM Government, including the Prime Minister, the Cabinet and junior ministers, as well as non-political civil servants that work in government departments routinely visit and/or work on the parliamentary estate. Disclosing the information requested may help to reassure the public that we have appropriate security measures in place to keep those who access the estate safe, including passholders and visitors. Furthermore, as these measures are financed by the public purse, there is a public interest in being to scrutinise these to ensure that they are cost-effective and fit for purpose.

However, we have also considered the public interest in withholding this information. Parliament continues to remain under threat from malicious groups and fixated individuals looking to target the estate in a number of different ways, including targeting specific areas of the estate for terroristic attacks, targeting specific individuals in order to advance a political or personal agenda or cause harm, disrupting core parliamentary processes related to legislation, stealing confidential information for personal gain or ransom, and numerous others. To counteract these threats, security measures, including the use of CCTV cameras, are in place on the estate specifically to deter and to hinder the success of these groups, and to ensure that those who use the parliamentary estate, especially Members, are able to carry out their duties in a safe and secure manner.

Releasing details of our CCTV supplier however would significantly undermine the safety of the estate, and in turn affect national security, as it would be of significant help to these groups and individuals. By disclosing this information, it would provide ample details on the type of CCTV equipment we are likely to use. This would be significantly helpful to malicious groups looking to target the estate, as it would allow them to plan in order to circumvent these measures, and would in turn increase their ability to launch attacks against those on the estate, thereby significantly increasing the risk of harm to those on the estate as a result. The release of this information would therefore be likely to deter both visitors and pass holders from attending the estate, which would in turn be likely to significantly disrupt the ability of parliament to function as a result, including disrupting legislative proceedings and other core parliamentary functions. This would also likely have a knock-on effect for governmental departments and their functions also, in particular those relating to parliamentary proceedings. The withholding of this information is therefore necessary in order to continue safeguarding national security on the parliamentary estate, as its release would create an unsafe environment more likely to be subject to attacks by groups and fixated individuals, affecting the ability of both passholders and parliament to function as a whole, and severely disrupting and compromising the protection of democracy as a result. For these reasons, we have concluded that the public interest in withholding the information outweighs the public interest in disclosure.

Section 31 – Law enforcement

We also consider that disclosing the same information would be likely to prejudice the prevention or detection of crime and the apprehension of offenders. This information is therefore also exempt by virtue of Section 31(1)(a) and (b) FOIA. This is a qualified exemption and the public interest test applies.

We have considered the public interest in disclosing this information. Disclosing details of our CCTV supplier would provide details and insight into the extent to which Parliament maintains the security and safety of those on the parliamentary estate, and this would help to reassure the public at large as well as those who attend or intend to visit the estate. Furthermore, as parliamentary security is financed via the public purse, there is a public interest in knowing that public funds spent on implementing security measures on the estate are cost-effective, proportional and appropriate.

However, we have also considered the public interest in withholding this information. CCTV cameras at our search points as well as the security measures we incorporate exist to detect and prevent criminal actions, including attempts by individuals to smuggle items onto the estate, for malicious purposes or otherwise, and to detect and prevent criminal actions on the estate also by extension. The disclosure of our CCTV supplier however would simply allow these same groups to plan to circumvent and counteract measures designed to detect them by allowing them to research the measures we likely have in place, in turn allowing them to plan accordingly to bypass and avoid these measures as a result. The release of this information would therefore be extremely likely to prejudice the prevention and detection of crime on the estate, as well as the apprehension of offenders, by making it easier for these malicious groups to circumvent our security measures, and in turn launch attacks against both the estate itself and passholders as a result. By restricting this information however, we can ensure that potential criminals are much more likely to be caught out by our security measures, and their crimes prevented in turn. In these circumstances therefore, it is our view that the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information.

Section 38 – Health and Safety

These same security measures are designed to keep people safe on the parliamentary estate, and we also consider that disclosing the same information would be likely to endanger the physical and mental health of individuals, as well as their safety, so this information is exempt by virtue of Section 38(1) (a) and (b) FOIA. This is a qualified exemption and the public interest test applies.

We have considered the public interest in disclosing this information. It is important for the public to know that we have thorough security measures in place for those who access the parliamentary estate, and that we ensure that those who attend the estate can do so safely and without fear of harm. Releasing details of our CCTV supplier would reassure those looking to interact more with Parliament that we have taken appropriate measures in place to protect them from harm and their physical health won’t be at risk, whether they’re visiting or attending events on the estate, or in fact looking to work on the estate itself, either in capacity as House staff, Members’ staff or possibly even as a Member themselves. The mental health of these persons may also be reassured by disclosing this informationand showing our dedication to protecting those who access the estate, making them more likely to want to interact with Parliament also. Lastly, as health and safety measures on the estate are publicly funded, there is also a public interest in showing that these measures are effective and appropriate.

However, we have also considered the public interest in withholding this information. Parliament has a duty to ensure that the physical and mental wellbeing of those who access the estate, including visitors and passholders. It has a duty to ensure the safety of those individuals, and this also extends to the release of any information which may compromise this safety. A safe and secure environment is a fundamental need for those on the estate to ensure they can carry out their work without threat or fear of violence, however, the release of this information would endanger the safety of those on the estate as it would allow malicious groups/individuals to bypass security measures designed to protect them, making them significantly more likely to be subject to harm as a result. Furthermore, the release of this information would also significantly harm the mental wellbeing of those who use the estate. It would create a greater sense of unease and vulnerability, which would be likely to severely impact their ability to carry out their duties as a result were they at a greater threat of individuals being able to smuggle prohibited and harmful items onto the estate. This could also potentially lead to pass holders and visitors alike refusing to attend the estate out of fear for their own safety, which would in turn disrupt many of the core aspects of the parliamentary process. The release of our CCTV supplier would therefore be likely to contribute to endangering both the physical and mental health of individuals on the estate, as well as endangering their safety, leaving them physically more vulnerable to attacks and affecting their mental wellbeing also as a result. In these circumstances therefore, it is our view that the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information.

c) and who is the lead contact please?

This information is held by the House of Commons. Our lead contact for CCTV services is the Director of Parliamentary Security.

14) Please can you confirm the number of Adobe or other PDF software solution licences being used across the business?

This information is held by the House of Commons. We have 750 PDF software solution licenses currently being used at the time of your request. Please note this represents the total for the House of Commons and House of Lords as a whole, and cannot be disaggregated.

15) Does the service currently use any Audio Visual/LED/LCD displays, interactive touch screen or Teams meeting room hybrid video conference facilities, and if yes,
a) please can you confirm the number of devices [and] manufacturer, and;

You clarified that you sought information relating to devices in hybrid meeting areas and “all parliamentary locations”.

This information is held by the House of Commons. We currently use Audio Visual/LED/LCD displays, interactive touch screen and Teams meeting room hybrid video conference facilities.

We hold a record that we have 14,608 relevant devices assigned to the House of Commons and a further 4,494 devices assigned bicamerally (to both the House of Commons and the House of Lords) whose numbers cannot be disaggregated between the two Houses. The manufacturers of these devices are Alcatel, ALTEC LANSING, AMC, Apple, Asus, Audio Technica, Australian, Behringer, Bosch, Casio, Creative, Creston, Current Thinking, DA Lite, Dell, DLP, EIZO, Epson, Genus Speaker, Glensound, Google, Hitachi, HP, JVC, Kramer, LG, Liyama, Microsoft, Millbank, Mivoc, NEC, Optoma, Paso TCA, Philips, Pioneer, Plycom, Presonus, Samsung, Sanyo, Seinheisser, Sharp, Sonifex, Sony, Starphone, Toshiba, W-audio and Yamaha.

b) any term of agreement in place for rental/lease
and
c) any maintenance agreements in use and the end date?

Some information is held by the House of Commons.

The devices detailed above have been purchased and not rented or leased. Some of these devices have maintenance agreements, and these are detailed (Table 4) (csv, 1KB).

16a) Who does the service use for all office supplies, (paper, stationary, inkjet/laser cartridges etc)
and
b) please can you advise on the average annual spend across the service?

Some information is held by the House of Commons. Our main office supplies contract is with Banner.
We do not hold a record of the ‘average annual spend’ with Banner, but we can advise you of the spend since August 2020, in calendar years (Table 5) (csv, 1KB).

We do not hold any information prior to August 2020.