Voting terminals (2020)

Response

Please note initially that the House of Commons and the House of Lords are separate public authorities for the purposes of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA). Our response only deals with online voting information for which the House of Commons is responsible, although some information may be held jointly between the two Houses through the bicameral Parliamentary Digital Service (PDS) and so would cover both Houses of Parliament. Therefore, you may wish to consider forwarding your request to the House of Lords directly.

1. How many of these machines have been procured?
   This information is held by the House of Commons. 4 terminals has been procured.
2. Please provide information on whether the machines are bought or leased
   This information is held by the House of Commons. The House has bought the machines.
3. What company has supplied the machines?
   This information is held by the House of Commons. However, information relating to your request is considered exempt from disclosure by the House under sections 24 & 31 FOIA. Please find our explanations for these decisions below.
   

   Section 24(1) – National security

   
   The supplier of these voting terminals is a piece of information which, if disclosed, would undermine the security of parliamentary procedure and the work of the government on the parliamentary estate. Section 24 FOIA provides an exemption from disclosure where provision of the information would make the UK or its citizens more vulnerable to a national security threat. This is a qualified or non-absolute exemption and the public interest test applies.
   There is a public interest in the supply of efficient and secure digital voting techniques to Parliament as a part of the hybrid-Parliament proceedings during the Covid-19 pandemic. There is a legitimate interest in how tax payers money is spent on fulfilling the House of Commons' constitutional role and facilitating the work of government (including Ministers). Further, the House recognises concerns over the introduction of new technology to conduct divisions in the House and national security concerns arising from the increased risk of cyberattack to disrupt the proper workings of government.
   The countervailing argument is that releasing the name of the terminal supplier, in connection with the estate, increases the likelihood that the company would become the target of attempts to disrupt the security of the estate. Further, it may give an indication of the manufacturer of the terminals which could be combined with existing knowledge or publicly available information to target the terminals directly to cause disruption to the voting system itself, a risk arising from the so-called mosaic effect. Groups planning attacks are known to conduct extensive research into the opposition they might face. The ability for fixated groups or individuals to interfere with equipment and software at the manufacturer stage or currently while the terminals are operating on the estate, may therefore significantly impact on national security through an interference with the integrity of the House of Commons' voting system. Whilst there may be a public interest in access to this information, it is considered that in this case it is not in the wider public interest to disclose as there is a risk of national security being compromised.
   

   Section 31(1)(a) – Law enforcement

   
   As we stated above, the supplier of these voting terminals is information which, if disclosed, would provide a significant indication of the level and quality of the extra security coverage proposed. The House believes that this would greatly increase the likelihood of voter fraud in House of Commons' divisions. Therefore, the release of this information is likely to prejudice the prevention or detection of crime and is therefore exempt by virtue of s.31(1)(a) FOIA. This is a qualified or non-absolute exemption and the public interest test applies.
   There is a public interest in the protection of the House of Commons' proceedings from criminal offences. As above there is a legitimate interest in the adequate security of parliamentary proceedings and that the introduction of new technologies does not undermine organisations and teams providing us with security and law enforcement. Unlawful interference with terminals used to enter votes in House divisions could constitute a criminal offence such as fraud. Information regarding the supplier of these terminals could provide an indication of the provision and quality of security arrangements protecting against unlawful access to the terminals and any data they store.
   This is outweighed by the risks of criminal activity being undertaken if the information was disclosed. In providing details of the supplier of the terminals, we would fail in our duty to prevent details of security arrangements and standards from falling into the hands of individuals with malicious or criminal intent against the estate or individuals thereon, which in turn would fail in our duty to assist those services providing us with law enforcement. The information would assist those seeking to gain unlawful access to these terminals or plotting cyber-attacks against a House of Commons' division by providing information that could disclose the sophistication and extent of the security on these terminals. Further, the increased likelihood of the supplier becoming a target for interference if disclosed in-turn increases the likelihood of the manufacturer becoming the target for criminal offences committed against their premises, staff or business that could otherwise by prevent by law enforcement authorities. It is our view that the greater public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information.
4. Please provide the length of any contract related to these machines e.g. service contract, lease contract etc.
   This information is held by the House of Commons. Whilst no specific contract exists solely for these terminals, the House has a contract with an external company who support general security systems related to these terminals. This contract is due to expire in December 2020.
5. How long are these machines are expected to be used for this purpose?
   This information is not held by the House of Commons. A move or return to a voting system that does not require these terminals is a decision for the House by way of a vote by the Members. No such decision has been made and so the House does not hold information on when these terminals will no longer be required.
   It may interest you to know that, when a vote is held in the House and a decision is made to change the voting system, it will be published in the Official Record of Parliament, known as Hansard, which is online and fully searchable on our parliamentary webpages.
6. Please provide information regarding any intention of expanding the number of machines in operation either for members of parliament or to extend the system to the House of Lords
   This information is not held by the House of Commons. No information held by the House indicated an intention to increase the number of terminals or extend their operation to the House of Lords.
   As stated above, you may wish to contact the House of Lords directly for this information using the email address provided at the top of our response.
7. A full breakdown of costs associated with the procurement, supply and operation of these machines including: total cost to date, any monthly costs such as lease or service fees, renewal fees, return fees, procurement services fees and any other fees that might be considered to be related to these machines and their presence and operation in parliament.
   Some information relating to this question is held by the House of Commons.
   Design, installation and hardware of the pass reader voting system cost £45,448. The cost of materials was £14,998 and the cost of labour was £30,491. These are the figures that the House requires for business purposes and cannot be disaggregated further.
   The House holds no information relating to the running costs, nor estimated likely running costs, at the time of your request. Section 1(4) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 only requires a public authority to provide information held at the time of a request being made. There is no obligation to create information to answer a question.