

House of Lords Select Committee on International Relations UK Foreign Policy in a Shifting World Order

Government Response

This Government thanks the House of Lords Select Committee on International Relations for its report, UK Foreign Policy in a Shifting World Order, which synthesises a huge amount of work and input from a wide range of influential thinkers at a critical time for the UK.

Below are the Government's responses to each of the Committee's recommendations and conclusions. The Committee's text is in bold and the Government's response is in plain text. Paragraph numbers refer to the Committee's report.

1. The US Administration has taken a number of high-profile unilateral foreign policy decisions that are contrary to the interests of the United Kingdom. In particular, US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on climate change, the Iran nuclear deal and the UN Human Rights Council, and the imposition of trade tariffs on its allies, undermine efforts to tackle pressing global challenges of critical importance to the UK. The Government's response of maintaining its commitment to these agreements and institutions has been the right one. (Paragraph 37)

The Government welcomes the Committee's support for its approach to these agreements and institutions. The UK has a special and enduring relationship with the US based on our long history and commitment to shared values. We are natural, resilient and strong allies, and we do more together than any two countries in the world. The US-UK security and defence partnership is central to our interests and, beyond public sight, our intelligence-sharing partnership is unrivalled. While investing in this bilateral relationship we will also continue to pursue multilateral cooperation on a wide range of issues, in particular where we see this as vital to securing enduring outcomes. We will work with the US whenever possible but will continue to seek outcomes that reflect UK values and interests even where there are points of difference, as with the Iranian nuclear agreement.

2. Below the political level, our witnesses asserted, the UK and US are deeply entwined through defence and intelligence links, and connections between officials, which should withstand political decisions by the Administration. The Government should reach out to those parts of American society which share our views and values; and the Government should increase support for the Marshall Scholarship scheme. (Paragraph 38)

Led by the British Embassy in Washington, and our network of Consulates-General (CGs) across the US, the FCO continues to reach out to all sections of American society. We are able to do this by staffing our Embassy and CGs with officials from across Whitehall, including the FCO, the Department for International Trade, Home Office, Department of Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, and others. From the world of politics (building connections with a broad range of Republican and Democratic interlocutors), to the worlds of business, trade, education, culture and other sectors, we seek to build long-lasting, positive and meaningful relationships across American society which withstand the changes in both US and British Administrations. The announcement in December by Sir Kim Darroch, the British Ambassador to the United States, of the 2019 Marshall programme intake marked a 50% increase in scholarships offered since 2016. We also are currently undertaking a

tailored review of the Marshall programme which will make recommendations on how we maximise the value we get from the programme and ensure its long term success. We will report back to Parliament on the outcome of the review in due course.

3. However, the difficulty the UK and its allies have faced in trying to influence the US demonstrates the challenge of working with the Administration. How damaging this will be to what has hitherto been the UK's most important international relationship will depend on whether the current approach is an enduring trend. Should President Trump win a second term, or a similar Administration succeed him, the damage to UK–US relations will be longer lasting; and the Government will need to place less reliance on reaching a common US/UK approach to the main issues of the day than has often been the case in the past. (Paragraph 39)

4. Some of the foreign policy decisions of the US Administration do not stem solely from the election of President Trump—they represent a broader shift towards a more inward-looking US, which is less focused on the transatlantic alliance and multilateralism, and the sense of the US losing power to other sources. In its diplomatic relations with the Administration, the UK should distinguish between those aspects of current US foreign policy which are driven by the current President, and those which are part of longer-term trends of divergence from the UK. (Paragraph 40)

The UK and US have a long history of close cooperation on foreign policy and global issues and this continues. We work together across the majority of issues, including security, defence and trade. In a wide range of areas, we remain closely aligned – for example, the US have now supported two UK-led UN Security Council Resolutions on Yemen (2451 & 2452), designed to bolster the peace process. Additionally, we worked closely with the US in response to the Salisbury attack, including the coordinated expulsion of Russian intelligence officers. There are, of course, areas of difference but our close relationship outweighs them, and allows us to be clear where we disagree. We agree that there have been longer term trends in US foreign policy – for example, scepticism of multilateral organisations that do not deliver effectively, and an appreciation of the growing importance of China. The UK will continue to work with the US to ensure that we maintain our close engagement after EU Exit. As part of this, the Global Britain staffing uplift includes increases at our posts in Washington, D.C., San Francisco and New York.

5. The Government's response to US foreign policy decisions needs now more than ever to be closely co-ordinated with like-minded countries throughout the world. (Paragraph 41)

In October 2018, the Foreign Secretary set out his vision for close cooperation with like-minded countries. We will work to retain and nurture important and powerful alliances with like-minded partners, of which the US is one. As we leave the EU, we will seek close relationships with EU countries, the US and other like-minded partners to pursue UK foreign policy objectives.

6. China's growing economic and political power gives it global influence, and it has become increasingly regionally assertive. We welcome the Government's now long-standing openness to China: it is not in the UK's interest to treat China systematically as an adversary. But the Government must ensure that this relationship does not

damage the UK's relations with the US or Japan nor efforts to forge a stronger relationship with countries like India. (Paragraph 67)

The Government agrees with the Committee's assessment. The UK has a strong relationship with China that supports economic growth and addresses global challenges. Equally, we have strong partnerships with other countries. The UK pursues an 'All of Asia' approach, ensuring that we are an active and present partner across the region.

Our strong relationship with India is demonstrated by the high level bilateral visit last year by Prime Minister Modi to the UK. With India, our shared democratic values, the strength of our Diaspora and our partnerships in fields including defence, technology and innovation show the firm footing and exciting future of the relationship. Similarly, the UK greatly values its partnership with Japan and the Prime Minister was very pleased to host Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe during his visit to the UK in January 2019. This visit is part of a step-change in UK-Japan relations and the two Prime Ministers outlined their vision through a comprehensive and ambitious Joint Statement for a forward-looking partnership fit for the twenty-first century.

Furthermore, and as referenced in the responses to recommendations one to four, the UK has a special and enduring relationship with the United States based on our long history and commitment to shared values. The visit last year by President Trump underlined just how close and important the relationship is to our security and our prosperity. Our joint diplomatic and military actions are illustrative of this.

7. While there are continuing concerns including China's human rights record and its behaviour in cyberspace, the Government should aim to work closely with China in finding responses to the main international challenges we face, such as climate change and freer and fairer world trade. But it should do so in a manner which is consistent with the rules-based international order, in particular international humanitarian law. (Paragraph 68)

In order to address global challenges, consistent engagement with the Chinese government and the wider Chinese system, including civil society, is essential.

In particular, UK-China cooperation on climate change and energy remains a key pillar of our bilateral relationship. As the world's largest emitter, China's engagement on the issue is crucial. Since 2015, our respective Climate Change Committees have collaborated to identify the key risks posed by dangerous climate change, recently releasing a report in London and at COP24 in Poland. We are currently discussing with Chinese counterparts how this work can be expanded to target a broader range of stakeholders and issues affected by climate change, including food and water security, health, economic growth, and national stability. Later this year, the UK will launch a new multi-year Prosperity Fund programme on Energy and Low Carbon Economy in China, which will seek to build on our previous collaboration, and draw on UK expertise in order to accelerate China's low carbon transition. Further, the UK has supported the development of China's national emissions trading scheme, which it is hoped will eventually cover ten percent of global emissions.

The Government reassures the Committee that our engagement with China is and will continue to remain consistent with our support for the rules based international order. The UK is a strong defender of the order, which has delivered an unparalleled period of peace

and stability. In some areas, such as human rights, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea or some of China's actions in cyberspace, China's approach challenges important principles of the international order. In these areas, we and our allies will continue to have frank conversations with China, and speak up for our own values. Where necessary we will speak out publicly.

8. In the longer term, the Government will need to weigh up the strategic challenge posed by China's approach to its international role, and its impact on the rules-based international order, against China's growing economic significance. (Paragraph 69)

China is the UK's largest trading partner outside Europe and North America. The UK is also open to Chinese inward investment, which remains important for our prosperity.

The rules based international system matters hugely to the UK. Strengthening this system, with the UN at its heart, is a key priority of British diplomacy. It enables global cooperation through which we seek to address international security and economic challenges, and also protects our values.

Over the last four decades, China has benefitted enormously from the stability and openness that the rules based international system has provided. It continues to do so. In particular, the parts that allow it to trade freely with the rest of the world have been central to its economic model. China therefore has an interest in preserving the international order, but understandably wants a growing say in how it operates.

As the Committee points out, China's position is sometimes at odds with parts of the rules based international system. Where China's approach challenges important principles of the order, such as human rights - an important part of the international architecture - we and our allies speak up for our own values. By having a strong relationship with China, the UK is able to have frank discussions on a range of difficult issues. The UK will continue to challenge China's interpretation of such issues where we disagree.

The Government believes that defending the rules based international system does not mean that the UK should resist reform or China's involvement in its reform. To defend the system most effectively the UK will continue to work with international partners, including China, to reform outdated and bureaucratic structures. We have already played an important role in supporting China's bid to increase its voting weight in the World Bank in 2018. We should support UN Secretary General Guterres' UN reform agenda and work with our international partners, including China, to improve the way the WTO operates to ward off the temptations of protectionism. China has an important contribution to make to the debates about how we advance these reforms, and we welcome this.

Looking ahead, the Government will continue to take a holistic view when balancing China's approach to the international order with its growing economic significance.

9. Russia is a declining power that is increasingly willing and able to use both traditional and new capabilities—such as cyber capabilities—to act as a disrupter in international relations. It is no longer a role model for idealist focus as it was during the Soviet era. We commend the Government for successfully co-ordinating a strong international response to the chemical weapons attack in Salisbury. The UK should

continue to work closely with its allies to counter Russian disinformation campaigns and deter its hybrid warfare tactics. (Paragraph 84)

We agree with the Committee's assessment of Russia's global aims. The Russian government uses a range of powers to pursue its policies – including espionage, cyber and subversion – and persistently uses disinformation as a tool to destabilise its perceived enemies. As noted by the Committee, in response to the attack in Salisbury we coordinated the largest ever collective expulsion of Russian intelligence officers together with our allies, fundamentally degrading Russian intelligence capability for years to come. We continue to work closely with partners to identify and condemn hostile state activity and take collective steps to protect our shared security. For example, the EU recently established a new chemical weapons sanctions regime and adopted its first set of listings. The international response since Salisbury has shown the strength of collective resolve to meet the challenges from Russia. We will continue to show our willingness to act, as a community of nations, to stand up for the international rules-based system and send clear messages on the consequences of Russia's malign activity.

10. The UK must also, nonetheless, remain open to dialogue with Russia on issues of common concern, such as counter-terrorism and nuclear nonproliferation. And it should not allow the inevitable increase in tension following the Salisbury attack to prevent a better understanding of developments in a country which remains important for our foreign policy. (Paragraph 85)

As the Prime Minister said in her speech to the Lord Mayor's Banquet in November 2018, we remain open to a different relationship – one where Russia desists from attacks that undermine international treaties and international security, and actions that undermine the territorial integrity of its neighbours, and instead acts together with us to fulfil the common responsibilities we share as permanent members of the UN Security Council, including on topics of international peace and security. As fellow Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, we will continue to engage on topics of international peace and security. We will also continue to engage with wider Russian society, through cultural exchanges, business links and programmes involving youth, civil society and human rights defenders. We continue to hold out hope that we will one day once again enjoy a strong partnership with Russia, but fully expect Russia to remain a key foreign policy priority for the long term. Over recent years the Government has sought to align its expertise with the complexity of issues relating to Russia. We have dedicated resource across government focused on Russian domestic and foreign policy, as well as defence, energy, and national security issues.

11. The UK has prioritised economic and trade links with India, but the potential security relationship has been under-developed. The Government should seek to reset and elevate its relationship with India by focussing on strategic priorities such as cybersecurity and maritime issues in the Indo- Pacific. (Paragraph 96)

Defence and security is a vital part of our relationship with India and was a key element of discussion during Prime Minister Modi's visit to the UK in April 2018. Our countries have engaged well together for many years – including through land, air and maritime bilateral exercises. In 2015, the UK and India signed the Defence and International Security Partnership (DISP), which has transformed the relationship further. The DISP has paved the way for greater military and civilian collaboration through establishing capability partnerships in strategic areas. Both countries are now exploiting the opportunities for technical

cooperation, equipment collaboration, joint exercises and information sharing (including in the maritime sphere). Some key areas of collaboration identified have included ship design, counter terrorism and UN Peacekeeping. The partnerships will also enable transfer of strategic capability between the UK and India, including defence technologies and manufacturing capacity in areas of mutual interest, including supporting Prime Minister Modi's 'Make in India' campaign. The UK-India defence partnership also encompasses developing industry-to-industry collaboration. Our engagement places capability and technology development at its core and harnesses the complementary strengths of both nations in defence manufacturing. The partnership makes use of the combined strengths of our respective private and public sectors to develop defence solutions for us in both home and shared export markets.

The DISP is also helping deepen our cooperation on counter-terrorism and cyber security. The UK and India are working to strengthen cyber cooperation. India has the world's second largest internet user base and the fastest growing online population. PM Modi's "Digital India" initiative presents opportunities for UK/India partnerships but we are also acting to ensure we harness the power of the internet while ensuring our safety and security online. This includes tackling cyber-crime and building resilience to attacks, learning from each other's cyber expertise and ensuring an ideological approach to the future development and governance of a cyberspace that best serves shared interests. In April 2018, we agreed to promote international security and stability in cyberspace through a bilateral framework agreement which recognises the applicability of international law to State behaviour in a free, open, peaceful and secure cyberspace. We hold an annual dialogue, with the most recent one taking place in June 2018. In June during our last annual dialogue we agreed to create Joint Working Groups across our government that would take collaboration forward in a formal and coordinated manner. The five joint working groups (Cyber Diplomacy, Capacity Building, Cyber Crime, Incident Response, and Cybersecurity of the Digital Economy) will operationalise the commitments made under the cyber framework.

The UK recognises the global importance of the Indo-Pacific region. A huge amount of all world trade passes through the key chokepoints in the region, including Bab-el-Mandeb, the Straits of Malacca, and the Straits of Hormuz. Over the last 15 years, the region has been susceptible to piracy, terrorism and organised crime. Recognising the importance not just to the UK economy, but also the global one, the UK plays an active role in maritime security in the Indian Ocean Region through military, multilateral and commercial engagement and capacity building. Some examples of this role include: UK contribution to EU Navfor (including hosting the mission); UK asset and staff contributions (including the deputy commander) to the Combined Maritime Forces; the operation of the UK Maritime Trade Operation (a world leader in 'see and avoid' shipping information); a permanent naval presence through Naval facilities in Bahrain, Oman and the British Indian Ocean Territory; capacity building across the region, including a 5,500 personnel strong exercise in Oman, deployment of Typhoons across Asia to train with other air forces and the deployment of a Type 45 destroyer for Exercise Konkan with India in December 2018. We are keen to increase our partnerships in the region to uphold security and ensure adherence to a common rules based international system (RBIS), ensuring a free, open and prosperous Indo-Pacific region. We are also looking beyond security, taking a whole of ocean approach to contribute to sustainability, clean oceans and developing the blue economy - areas that matter greatly to India, including as part of their commitments under the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

12. The Government must recognise the negative impact of the restrictive UK regime for visas and migration on the UK-India relationship and soft power links between the two countries; and in the forthcoming White Paper and legislation on the UK's post-Brexit immigration policy should reshape policy with the objective of addressing India's concerns. (Paragraph 97)

The UK Government has long been aware of how valuable a positive UK-India relationship on migration is. Indians value the UK's soft power assets, such as leading educational institutions, cultural outreach and tourist attractions. During Prime Minister Modi's visit to the UK in April 2018, he strongly advocated the 'living bridge', a connection between the UK and India made up of people, culture and ideas. Ensuring this living bridge operates as efficiently as possible is important to our governments.

We welcome Indians who come to the UK to visit, study and work legally. In the year ending September 2018, 90% of Indian nationals who applied for a UK visa were successful. During the same period, over 475,000 visitor visas were granted to Indian nationals, an increase of 10% on 2017 and the largest absolute increase of any country. By the end of September 2018, 19,000 Indians were granted Tier Four visas to study in the UK, an increase of 33 % on the previous 12 months. Over half of all Tier Two skilled work visas issued globally are to Indians. In the year ending September 2018, over 55,000 Tier Two visas were granted to Indian nationals. We welcome the skills and talent that Indians bring to the UK economy.

The Government is also working closely with the Government of India to address associated migration problems including visa over-stayers and the extradition of financial fugitives. We will continue to work towards a more modern and efficient returns arrangements with India, which will support an enhanced migration partnership more broadly.

After EU Exit, as an open, inclusive and outward facing Global Britain, the UK wants to build its position as a top destination for innovation, including in our world leading tech sector. The Government White Paper sets out a foundation to attract and support skilled workers, who want to bring ideas and start a business in the UK. UK government officials on 16 January 2019 visited New Delhi for talks with the Indian Government on migration, signalling a new phase of cooperation on this key issue. Officials also met key figures from the corporate, business and education sectors in India, to discuss how the UK's Future Border and Immigration System could benefit India.

13. The Government should recognise the increasing regional influence of middle ranking emerging powers in Africa, Asia and Latin America and should work more closely with them in addressing problems and disputes arising in their regions. We welcome the Foreign Secretary's commitment to this objective in his evidence to us. (Paragraph 98)

The Government agrees with the recommendation to work more closely with middle ranking emerging powers in Africa, Asia and Latin America. In Africa, the increasingly significant role of African regional powers is embedded in the UK's approach to addressing challenges in the continent. The Government engages closely with countries such as Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa both diplomatically and through our international programmes to reduce conflict, support economic development, shape global rules and financial systems, mitigate climate change impacts and improve the provision of global public goods. We also work closely with the African Union - as an important pan-African actor - to address these challenges. As the

Prime Minister said in her speech in Cape Town on 28 August, we are creating a new partnership between the UK and Africa based on shared prosperity and security. The UK is increasing UK staff with a focus on Africa by up to a third by 2021, increasing our ability to engage and influence.

In the Asia-Pacific region, the formal structure of the annual UK Foreign and Defence Ministers' meetings with Australia and Japan has resulted in a more systematic and operational approach to common foreign and security policy challenges, such as denuclearisation on the Korean peninsula, solving the Rohingya refugee crisis, maritime security, and counter-terrorism. We are working closely with Australia and New Zealand, including through co-location, as we open diplomatic posts in the Pacific, a region at the forefront of the fight against the effects climate change. Seeking common approaches to such challenges has also become a higher priority for the UK's annual strategic dialogues and other high-level exchanges with middle-ranking emerging powers in South East Asia, such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines. While bilateral issues and, with some, human rights concerns still feature prominently, bilateral exchanges on regional security issues are becoming more specific and open. The opening of the new UK mission to the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2019 will offer further opportunities to pursue common regional security objectives.

In Latin America, we are strengthening our regional coverage through increased staff in a number of posts, and are looking to developing our relationship with regional organisations, in particular the Pacific Alliance and the Organisation of American States. Countries like Colombia, Chile and Peru, with growing middle classes and increasingly well-educated populations, share our liberal democratic and free trading values, which provides us with an opportunity to address common challenges at the regional and global levels, from migration, conflict and climate change pressures to cyber and human rights issues.

14. In the context of a strained transatlantic relationship, an increasingly assertive China, a disruptive Russia and broad shifts to the global balance of power, it remains firmly in the UK's national interest to maintain the strongest possible partnership on foreign and security policy with its likeminded European partners, both bilaterally and at an EU level, after Brexit. (Paragraph 103)

As we consider the transatlantic relationship, an increasingly assertive China, a disruptive Russia and broad shifts to the global balance of power, it remains firmly in the UK's national interest to maintain the strongest possible partnership on foreign and security policy with its likeminded European partners, both bilaterally and at an EU level, after EU Exit.

The Prime Minister has been clear that we want to maintain our deep and special partnership with the EU on foreign policy and security issues once we have left the European Union. We have offered unconditional support for Europe's security, so we can protect the close cooperation we currently enjoy. The Political Declaration we have agreed with the EU reiterates both sides' commitment to cooperate in key areas of shared interest across foreign policy, security and defence. This Declaration provides a good basis for future discussions with the EU on these issues in the next stage of the negotiations.

Our bilateral ties with European partners provide a strong foundation for continued cooperation. Since the referendum we have significantly strengthened our network of Embassies across Europe, creating approximately 250 new UK-based and locally engaged

roles in Europe to work on EU Exit, our bilateral relations and key foreign policy issues. We ensure regular Ministerial and senior official visits to European countries and have a well-established pattern of close cooperation on foreign policy issues when operating in third countries which will continue beyond our exit from the EU. We will also continue to cooperate through our shared membership of other multilateral fora, including organisations such as NATO, the OSCE, the UN, and through groupings such as the Northern Future Forum with Nordic and Baltic partners.

With regard to the transatlantic relationship, it is ever more important for the Europe and the US to stand together, even when we may disagree on individual issues. These disagreements are far outweighed by the many areas of transatlantic cooperation. The UK will continue to play an important role in promoting transatlantic unity.

15. The Government should place a renewed emphasis on building alliances across the world and engaging with networks of likeminded partners. (Paragraph 104)

The Government agrees with the importance of continuing to build alliances and networks of partners. By the end of 2020, our network will gain over 1000 new positions alongside the opening of 14 new Missions over the same period. This will extend our reach and impact with sovereign missions in 161 countries. This will play an important role in our strengthening alliances worldwide. The Government's responses to recommendations 50 – 52, below, address this point in greater detail.

16. The relatively low cost of some cyber capabilities is one more technological factor that has created an asymmetrical shift in the balance of power. Russia, for example, is able to disrupt international affairs despite its declining economic position. (Paragraph 143)

Cyber attacks are increasingly used by a range of threat actors to commit the crimes of (including intellectual property theft), espionage and sabotage, disrupt critical systems, deliver reputational damage, and in general project power and confront adversaries.

Russia's intelligence services clearly develop and use cyber capabilities. With these capabilities, Russia can use the open and interconnected nature of cyberspace, combined with a veneer of technical obfuscation and deniability, to have effect at volume and speed. They are often indiscriminate and reckless in their approach and have targeted political institutions, businesses, media and sport.

The UK is working closely with allies to address these issues, to call out and respond to unacceptable state behaviour and ensure malicious actors cannot act with impunity, particularly below the threshold of armed attack.

17. Increased connectivity increases the vulnerability of critical national infrastructure to attack. (Paragraph 144)

Part of the core work of the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) is helping organisations understand and reduce their cyber security risks, which has to be informed by the realities of how they operate and the challenges they face. The NCSC supports owners, operators and suppliers in partnership with Lead Government Departments and the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) to ensure that security is considered holistically

across cyber, physical and personnel security disciplines. The NCSC continues to work on identifying what is really critical in cyber Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) and identify risks to CNI through the supply chain and identify dependencies between CNI sectors.

18. Major developments in emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing, by China and other rising powers could further alter the balance of power. (Paragraph 145)

Emerging technologies could be considered a 'disruptor' to traditional power structures and traditional foreign policy actors. They present the UK with new opportunities but also with new challenges. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office is increasing its work on emerging technology and the expertise of its staff. Its overseas network of Posts, including its Science and Innovation Network, work to facilitate research and development cooperation to support future economic growth as well as deliver other emerging technology priorities. This includes ensuring the Government's Industrial Strategy Grand Challenge on Artificial Intelligence is successful. Working closely with DCMS and other departments in the UK, the FCO is also working to increase its understanding of the risk that emerging technologies present to global economies, stability and safety, and what international mechanisms exist (or should exist) that will allow scientific and technological solutions to the world's biggest problems to be developed, safely and with equitable access.

The significance placed on quantum computing standards in global standards bodies is indicative of its importance to future security. The Government continues to promote the importance of technical standards being developed in an open and transparent manner by industry-led, global standards bodies in order to provide assurances regarding the robustness of the development process and to maintain a global, interoperable internet. The development of politically-driven standards on any other internet-related technology, including quantum computing in the future, holds the potential to undermine our vision for a free, open, peaceful and secure cyberspace.

19. Digital communications tools have intensified public and lobbying pressure on governments, increased the number of actors involved, and resulted in a much wider audience for foreign policy making. This connectivity has increased the pace at which some events take place and information is disseminated, such as during the Arab Spring, as well as governments' ability to understand events, and the speed at which they have to respond. (Paragraph 154)

20. It will be important for the FCO and the UK's diplomatic missions abroad to capitalise on the usefulness of digital communications and to be proficient in their use. But care will be needed to avoid crossing the line into interference in their host country's internal politics. (Paragraph 155)

The Government welcomes the Committee's conclusion that digital communication is a core aspect of diplomacy and its recognition of the importance of the FCO's work to equip diplomats with the skills needed to undertake this work. A recent internal survey concluded that social media is an essential tool of ambassadors and that leaders in the organisation are fully integrating social media in their public diplomacy. The FCO's targeted digital communications training programme will continue to upskill diplomats and locally-engaged officials to be able to take full advantage of the opportunities digital diplomacy provides, as well as deal with the risks.

The Open Source Unit supports the FCO to make better use of data to inform foreign policy and diplomacy, using a range of new tools and data sources to deliver analysis and products which support UK Foreign Policy priorities. This includes the development of methods to process large amounts of information more effectively.

21. Cyber security is an increasingly important global challenge. The UK has strong capabilities in this area; this presents the UK with an opportunity to be a world leader on a critical global issue. (Paragraph 167)

The Government agrees that the UK has strong capabilities in this area. We take a global leadership role and aim to safeguard the long-term future of a free, open, peaceful and secure cyberspace, driving economic growth and underpinning the UK's national security. We promote the operational implementation of agreed norms of responsible state behaviour and focus on positive practical measures states can take to put these voluntary norms into practice, including international co-operation to deter malicious cyber activity by criminals, state actors and their proxies. We work with partners across all continents to design and deliver tailored capacity building to help states increase their own cyber security and we have allocated over £30m over 2018-2021 to help underpin these efforts. The £15 million announced by the Prime Minister on the eve of the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting will help Commonwealth countries strengthen their cyber security capabilities and help to tackle criminal groups and hostile state actors who pose a global threat to security, including in the UK.

The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) is known internationally as a model for its cyber security approach. Its international partnerships help to share information and combat common cyber threats. The NCSC has hosted delegations from 54 countries across six continents, and its staff have visited 18 countries for bilateral meetings and public engagements. One of the NCSC's most important pieces of work is the world-leading active cyber defence initiative, which uses automation to reduce some of the most common weaknesses in cyber security defences.

22. A problem facing any international agreement on cyber security is that attribution is uncertain and the involvement of private actors extensive. Any new rules pose the question of to whom they should be applied, and whether the source can be located. (Paragraph 168)

Attribution of responsibility is a pertinent issue in relation to all hybrid or covert activity. It is important that states call out others when they are acting irresponsibly or recklessly and ensure malicious actors cannot act with impunity.

Attribution of cyber incidents is not easy, but nor is it impossible. With international partners, the UK has attributed a number of cyber incidents or campaigns since 2017. These include the Wannacry ransomware attack to DPRK actors the Lazarus Group, the NotPetya destructive malware attack to the Russian Government, a multi-year computer network exploitation campaign targeting universities to the Mabna Institute in Iran, APT28 to Russia's GRU and APT10 to elements of the Ministry of State Security in China.

By attributing unacceptable state behaviour, the UK and likeminded partners continue to demonstrate our commitment to promoting international stability frameworks for cyberspace based on the application of existing international law, agreed voluntary norms of responsible state behaviour and confidence building measures, supported by coordinated capacity

building programmes. Attribution of unacceptable behaviour, combined with the Attorney General's speech in May 2018, outlines the Government's view of how (not if) international law applies in cyberspace.

The private sector plays an important role including cyber security companies that identify Advance Persistent Threat groups. Their work contributes to raising the awareness of businesses and individuals through their publications.

23. It is unlikely that there would be agreement on a comprehensive, binding international treaty on cyber security. Instead the Government should convene like-minded countries into a 'coalition of the willing' to establish 'rules of the road' in cyberspace, using Lord Hague of Richmond's seven principles for an international agreement on cyberspace as the starting point. These 'rules of the road' would lay the groundwork for a more binding international agreement in the future. (Paragraph 169)

Cyber security is a global challenge that requires global solutions and increased international cooperation. Existing international law is applicable in cyberspace as it is in any other domain; we do not believe there is a need for a comprehensive, binding international treaty on cyber security as this would undermine existing frameworks and put a brake on efforts to operationalise norms of responsible state behaviour and confidence building measures. These norms and confidence building measures have been agreed globally since Lord Hague of Richmond's seven principles were set out in 2011 – through discussion and debate at the UN, regional organisations and also the Global Conferences on Cyber Security (GCCS) which started with the 2011 London Process. Building global understandings on national approaches is fundamental to maintaining long-term peace and security and reducing the risk of conflict in cyberspace. To assist with this, the UK Attorney General also set out the UK's views on the application of international law for the first time at Chatham House in May 2018.

The UK works in partnership with a wide range of countries bilaterally and through the EU, the UN, OSCE, NATO and where possible with other regional organisations including the ASEAN Regional Forum, the African Union, the Commonwealth and the Organisation of American States. Additionally, we coordinate directly through the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise (GFCE) where we promote the GFCE Global Agenda for Cyber Capacity agreed at the 2017 Delhi GCCS. The UK Government also works closely with a wide range of countries and the EU on issues related to international cooperation on cyber-crime, challenging initiatives by Russia in particular to reshape international definitions and the scope of the cyber-crime agenda that would put a free and open internet at risk.

24. We welcome the Government's work within NATO to develop the Alliance's thinking on cyber issues. It should seek to play a leading role in establishing cyber norms, increasing the Alliance's cyber resilience, and developing a common understanding of the potential impact on security and warfare of emerging technologies such as increased automation. (Paragraph 170)

The Government recognises the importance of sharing UK expertise with allies on a range of cyber issues, including cyber defence and resilience, to develop a common understanding on the potential impact of emerging technologies on security and warfare. The UK continues to take an active role in NATO and is an advocate for developing the Alliance's thinking on cyber issues. The UK was an active proponent of the decision made at the Warsaw Summit

in 2016 to recognise cyberspace as a domain of operations and is supporting NATO in its development of its Cyber Operations Centre in Mons, Belgium, which will increase NATO's ability to defend its own networks.

Prior to this in 2014, the UK became a full member of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Estonia where the UK plays a leading role in enhancing capability, cooperation and information sharing in cyber defence. In 2016, the UK hosted the second in a series of international cyber symposiums, an event that brought together military representatives from 30 countries as well as experts from government, industry and academia. This event provided an ideal gateway to develop international relationships and establish cyber norms. In May 2019, the UK will host the second annual NATO Cyber Defence Pledge Conference, where the UK will share expertise with Allies on a range of cyber issues and facilitate cyber capacity building efforts between Allies.

25. The active engagement of technology companies in establishing behavioural norms in cyberspace, and in any potential enforcement of those norms, will be crucial. The Government should seek better to engage technology companies and international partners in developing rules on cyber security and governance, and solving the challenge of attribution. (Paragraph 171)

The Government recognises that our economic prosperity and social well-being depend in part on the openness and security of networks beyond our own borders. We are committed to promoting international stability frameworks for cyberspace based on the application of existing international law, agreed voluntary norms of responsible state behaviour, and confidence building measures supported by coordinated and targeted capacity building programmes. We believe in a multi-stakeholder model of internet governance and will seek to ensure that the UN groups formed in 2019, as a result of UNGA 73 First Committee resolutions on cyberspace and international security, find a way to consult these important stakeholders.

The Government believes that the private sector, academia, government and civil society each play important roles in improving global cybersecurity. The rules, standards and best practices we develop together are fundamental to generating trust and reaping the benefits of innovation and growth across the digital economy. From industry coming together to develop best practice in managing cyber risk, to ensuring robust development and manufacturing of digital products and services which are Secure By Design, industry involvement is crucial to making us more secure. Listening to the needs and expertise of the cybersecurity sector is also key to growth.

Partnership with industry, including technology companies, is also an important part of the work of the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC). NCSC's partners provide a vital service to keep our communications secure. The NCSC's Industry 100 initiative brings together public and private sector talent to generate innovative ideas and collaborate on some of the latest cyber security challenges.

We recognise that building the cyber security talent pipeline is essential to ensuring that every organisation in the UK is resilient to support a prosperous digital nation. So we have worked closely with industry to develop a range of initiatives designed to boost cyber skills in the UK. This is just one example of our close collaboration and we continue to engage broadly across both the UK cyber security sector, and with international technology

companies, to ensure that the rules, standards and best practice we develop together support the UK's wider cybersecurity interests.

The Government will take forward further engagement with service providers to ensure they have robust protections in place against continuing and emerging cyber threats – it is clear that in some cases, basic cyber security measures are still not being taken, and this is not acceptable. In early 2019, there will be a roundtable hosted by the Government and NCSC inviting a broad range of senior representatives from suppliers to government, including managed service providers and service integrators. Together the community will discuss the step change that is required in contracting and security controls to tackle cyber threats to government and beyond.

26. The Foreign Secretary's view is that the Trump Administration's objective is to reform rather than disrupt and damage the UN. We are more sceptical, having heard evidence of actions it has taken which could undermine the UN. The Government should continue to resist US challenges to the UN and should work with other like-minded countries to compensate any resulting shortfalls in resources for the UN and its agencies. (Paragraph 204)

While there is some evidence of US disengagement from the UN, including their leaving the Human Rights Council and UNESCO, there is also clear evidence of the US driving engagement through the UN, for example, in the UN Security Council on the DPRK agenda and on peacekeeping missions. On balance, the Government believes that the way to maintain US engagement with the UN and minimise the risk of their withdrawing further, is to work with them, and with other UN Member States on delivering UN reform in a way that optimises the collective UN performance, improves coordination and maximises the impact the UN has on the ground.

The Government believes that all UN Member States should ensure that the payment of their assessed contributions to the UN Regular Budget and UN Agencies' budgets are made in full and on time. This is essential to ensure that the UN has the resources it needs to function and carry out the mandates given to it by Member States. Non-payment, part-payment and any resulting funding shortfalls are a matter for the UN to pursue with the relevant Member States. However, the UN cannot be left in a financial position which leaves it unable to function and the Government looks forward to the expected budgetary reform proposals from the UN Secretary-General which will allow him additional flexibility in managing the UN budget.

The Government is of the view that UN Member States will not and should not always be in a position to meet funding shortfalls created by others. However, the Government has worked with partners to fill gaps in, for example, UN Works and Relief Agency (UNWRA) funding, as well as on longer-term cost-saving reforms to ensure that UNWRA has a sustainable future.

27. Reform to the UN Security Council is necessary but difficult to achieve. We regret that efforts by the UK and France to reform the Security Council by expanding its membership have not progressed. The Government should focus on advocating reforms to the UN to overcome fragmentation and incoherence, as set out in our report The United Nations General Assembly 2018. (Paragraph 205)

The Government will continue to support a modest expansion of the Security Council, in both the permanent and non-permanent categories of membership. The UK supports new permanent seats for Brazil, Germany, India and Japan, as well as permanent African membership of the Council. We will continue to engage in the negotiations in New York to find an agreed approach to UN Security Council reform. The UK has worked to actively support the UN Secretary General's wider UN reform agenda aimed at improving coherence and effectiveness, including through new governance structures and enhanced co-ordination and accountability. We welcome the progress made thus far, and will work to support implementation of the measures agreed.

28. The Government should support efforts by the UN to engage with other groups, such as NGOs, to make it a more responsive and modern organisation, more than 70 years after it was founded. (Paragraph 206)

The Government agrees that the UN should engage a wide range of stakeholders, including NGOs, business and the private sector in its work. As well as providing external insights, NGOs can also helpfully draw attention to a situation, for example, human rights NGOs in-country, in a way that the UN may be unable to do. The Government has been active in guarding and protecting the space in which civil society can thrive. We regularly oppose the actions of states which try to restrict the participation of NGOs in UN meetings and events and, during the UK Presidency of the Security Council in August 2018, we invited six civil society representatives to brief the Council.

Individuals can also provide invaluable expertise. For example, the members of the High Level Panel on Mediation, which can help to shape future UN work streams. The Government has regular contact with a number of civil society groups with an interest in the UN, and has supported their efforts by, for example, funding civil society initiatives on UN reform. Business and the private sector also have an important role to play in providing different perspectives, for example, through the UN Global Compact's work on corporate sustainability.

29. We commend the UK's efforts to encourage European Allies to meet their agreed 2% NATO commitment. This is important both to ensure that NATO has the requisite capabilities and to sustain US support for the Alliance. (Paragraph 223)

The Government welcomes the Committee's support and agrees on the importance of NATO members increasing their defence spending to ensure that NATO is fit to meet the security challenges we all face. NATO is making progress, with non-US Allies spending an additional \$87.6 billion on defence since 2014. A growing number of Allies have made positive commitments to invest more in defence. We welcome Chancellor Merkel's announcement last year that Germany, a key NATO Ally, will increase defence spending to 1.5% of GDP by 2024. But there is more to be done. At present, the UK is one of a small number of NATO Allies that are meeting, or are close to meeting the 2% target. We will continue to encourage our Allies to step up their efforts to meet the Defence Investment Pledge, urging those that have not done so to demonstrate a credible path towards meeting the 2% target.

30. Quality of spending is also important: NATO Allies should spend a substantial proportion of their 2% defence expenditure on major equipment including research and development. (Paragraph 224)

The Government agrees with this recommendation. Spending 20% of defence expenditure on major equipment is a key component of NATO's Defence Investment Pledge. This is essential to ensuring that the Alliance has the capabilities it needs to deter and defend against any threat, from across the 360 degrees of NATO's periphery. The UK continues to lead by example, meeting the NATO commitment and investing at least 20% of our defence budget in major equipment.

31. The strategic ambiguity of NATO's Article 5 in the context of cyber-attacks provides Allies a degree of flexibility and guards against unwanted escalation. We conclude that amending Article 5 is unnecessary; the Government should oppose any proposals to revise it. (Paragraph 225)

The Government agrees that amending Article 5 is unnecessary. Article 5 gives Allies the flexibility to make a judgement based on specific circumstances, including those involving non-traditional and non-kinetic forms of attack. Invoking Article 5 is for the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to decide on a case-by-case basis.

At the Wales Summit in 2014, NATO agreed that cyber defence is part of the Alliance's core task of collective defence. Allies also agreed that they could invoke Article 5 in response to a cyber-attack that threatened national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security, and stability on a case-by-case basis. In 2016, Allies also agreed to make cyber a domain of operations as NATO must be able to operate as effectively in cyberspace as we do in the air, on land, and at sea.

The UK continues to drive efforts in NATO to strengthen NATO and Allies' ability to deter and defend against cyber threats. We were the first Ally to offer our offensive cyber capabilities to the Alliance, with others subsequently following suit. Following UK leadership, Allies endorsed a mechanism to incorporate sovereign offensive cyber capabilities into Alliance operations and missions at the NATO Summit in July 2018. Allies also agreed to create a NATO Cyberspace Operations Centre, and we are encouraging NATO to think about malicious cyber activities that fall below the threshold of the use of force.

32. Maintaining the World Trade Organisation and the Bretton Woods institutions, and developing the rules of international trade and finance, will become even more important to the UK after it leaves the EU. This will be necessary to prevent trade anarchy, leading to worse things—as was the hideous story of the 1930s. (Paragraph 238)

33. The US Administration's unilateral approach to trade is a major concern. The Government must do all it can to uphold the functioning of the WTO. It should consider with like-minded countries ways of circumventing the US blockage on appointments to the WTO's dispute settlement mechanisms. (Paragraph 239)

The Government agrees with the Committee on the importance of the rules based economic system in promoting international standards to maintain fair and open markets. The Government strongly supports the rules-based international trading system, with the WTO at its centre. At the G20 Leaders' Summit in Buenos Aires in December, the Prime Minister called for urgent and ambitious reform of the WTO. We welcome the agreement at the Summit to support the necessary reform of the WTO to improve its functioning. Leaders will

review progress at the next G20 Summit in Japan in June. The US President has said that he wants the WTO to modernise. Recent EU-US talks included an agreement to co-operate on WTO reform. We look forward to meaningful discussions with the US and other WTO partners on this issue. On the WTO Dispute Settlement System, the UK continues to work closely through the EU with other WTO members, including the US, to find solutions to the blockage of member appointments to the system's appeals body.

The Government shares many of the US' concerns about China's industrial strategy, investment practices, restrictions on foreign direct investment, technology licensing and a range of administrative regulations and informal practices which create challenges for foreign businesses. But we believe any action must be WTO compliant, and see dialogue and international cooperation, not unilateral action, as the right means to address these issues. Our priority is to ensure that trade is fair as well as free. We will continue to work with our trade partners, including the US, China and as part of the EU, to address the underlying concerns and seek multilateral co-operation on issues like intellectual property and global overcapacity in steel and aluminium. We will also use our voice in the WTO as a champion for trade for development, not only because it is the right thing to do, but also because developing countries (which make up two thirds of WTO membership) will be important allies and trading partners of the future.

34. We welcome the UK's engagement with new international institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. The UK should use its membership to seek to shape the lending terms and governance of these bodies. (Paragraph 256)

The Government agrees with the Committee. As a founding member of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the UK has been able to influence and ensure that the AIIB adopts global standards and best international practices, for example in their policies on transparency, procurement, complaints, risk and the environment. We will continue to use our position on the AIIB Board of Directors to shape the development of this institution.

35. The Government should also follow closely the development of other regional groupings—such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. We echo Lord Hague's view that participation in new organisations could be very valuable, and we highlight the potential of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, and the Pacific Alliance. (Paragraph 257)

The Government agrees with the recommendation and closely follows the development of regional groupings. It has previously engaged with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Secretariat through the British Embassy in Beijing.

As outlined in the Government's White Paper on the future relationship with the EU, and as the Prime Minister set out to Parliament in July 2018, the UK will potentially seek accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) on terms consistent with the future relationship with the EU, and domestic priorities. By signing the CPTPP, 11 countries – including economies projected to be a major driver of global economic growth over the coming years – have shown their support for free and rules-based trade. The UK, as a liberal and open economy, is committed to these principles and will work with like-minded countries to support them, including through potential accession to this important new agreement, which came into force on 30th December

2018. CPTPP membership moreover represents an opportunity for the UK to further develop its strong trade presence in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as reducing costs for UK consumers on imports from these markets.

The public consultation last year sought views on the UK potentially pursuing membership of CPTPP and negotiating bilateral agreements with the US, Australia and New Zealand. While this is our current focus, we remain open to considering all future opportunities as we develop an independent UK trade policy for the first time in 40 years.

36. The Government should be willing to develop and work with appropriate networks (such as the UN Global Compact, which supports the global business community in advancing UN goals and values through responsible corporate practices) and groups of countries to find solutions to international challenges. (Paragraph 265)

The Government agrees with the recommendation. The Government is deeply committed to the values of the multilateral system, which is vital for reducing global poverty, promoting stability and prosperity and delivering the Sustainable Development Goals. The UK is one of the largest donors to the multilateral system and our significant relationships with leading multilaterals help ensure collective action on the big, international challenges. Through DFID's £30M Responsible Accountable Transparent Enterprise programme we are supporting a number of organisations working with businesses to promote the Global Goals. This includes the UN Global Compact, whom we provide core annual funding to, and whose "Decent Work platform", which aims to help deliver SDG 8, we co-sponsor. DFID works with other countries bilaterally and through groupings such as G7 and G20 to make sure our combined efforts are as effective as possible in achieving the SDGs by 2030. As part of the UK's Voluntary National Review of the Sustainable Development Goals, DFID is working closely with partners including both civil society and businesses across the country. We meet regularly with the UN Global Compact and have spoken at several of their Sustainable Development Goal roadshows.

37. Contacts and engagement between civil society groups and individuals have the ability to generate enduring connections and activities across borders. The Commonwealth network, based on increasingly close links at all levels of society, may prove remarkably well adapted to the modern age of connectivity. (Paragraph 266)

The Government agrees on the significant added value of the Commonwealth as a global network in the modern age of connectivity, including in promoting the rules based international system. As Chair-in-Office, our approach is to encourage greater collaboration between its three pillars - its diverse member states, its network of over eighty accredited organisations, and its intergovernmental organisations - to deliver a fairer, more sustainable, more secure and prosperous future, as agreed at the Heads of Government Meeting in London in April 2018.

This includes specific support to Commonwealth professional and civil society organisations, including for example a £4 million project working with the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association and the Westminster Foundation for Democracy to support more inclusive and accountable democracy, and a programme working with a civil society coalition to address discriminatory legislation. While member states' views on some issues may reflect disparate perspectives, we are convening regular Commonwealth groupings of member states in New

York to share information and best practice and build common understanding of trade, human rights and climate change issues. We are also funding technical advisers in the Commonwealth Small States Offices to provide practical advice and expertise in relation to the WTO and the Human Rights Council.

38. *The rules-based international order in all its manifestations—which is critical to the UK’s national interest—is under serious threat from multiple directions.* (Paragraph 282)

The Government agrees that the rules based international system (RBIS) is being challenged and, in important cases, its rules flouted. This should not, however, obscure the widespread support, and significant resilience, that the system enjoys based on the value it offers to the global community. This is based on the unparalleled peace and prosperity that the RBIS has delivered since 1945, and the opportunities for co-operation on the widest possible range of issues that it provides to its member states.

39. *The policies of major powers—Russia, China and increasingly the United States—present considerable challenges to the multilateral institutions that underpin this order. Yet many of the problems facing states, such as climate change, terrorism and migration, are increasingly complex and trans-national. The Government should make the defence of the rules-based international order a central theme of all its bilateral relationships. This is particularly important in the UK’s engagement with the US, China, Russia and emerging powers such as India.* (Paragraph 283)

The UK has been, and will remain, a leading advocate and defender of the RBIS and its principles of peaceful co-operation to deliver shared security, mutual prosperity and shared values. We regularly discuss how to support, and reinforce, the different aspects of the RBIS with all our international partners, including those with whom we do not always agree. We do this in multilateral negotiations, and through our wider multilateral and bilateral contacts as well as in our outreach to global civil society.

40. *Pressures on the rules-based international order also come from beyond the state, in the form of technology and protests. The roots of this instability are many, but one is the enormous access to information and spread of opinion caused by communications and connectivity.* (Paragraph 284)

The Government agrees that new technology and the enormous rise in connectivity has given people new ways to engage with both governments and international institutions. This allows information and opinions to be shared widely and quickly. Sometimes this is used positively, for example to highlight violations and abuses of human rights; and sometimes negatively, such as the malicious spreading of information designed to cause damage. The UK’s policy is to promote and protect the right to freedom of expression, including in the digital sphere.

41. *The Government must not lose sight of its core values—particularly the rule of law and respect for international commitments—which are fundamental to the good functioning of a rules-based system for international trade, economics and security. Tension between the UK’s commercial interests and its values is likely to occur more frequently in its relationships with authoritarian countries and its pursuit of new trade deals across the world.* (Paragraph 285)

The UK has been a strong, and consistent, defender of the rules based order, including rules in areas such as human rights, security and the legal frameworks for trade. We believe that respecting and defending those rules is, and will remain, fundamental to British interests at home and overseas, alongside the pursuit of commercial interests.

42. In the context of the US Administration's hostility to multilateralism, the UK will need to work with like-minded nations to move ahead on some global issues without US participation or support, or a changed nature of engagement. But it should always leave the door fully open for the US to join at a later stage. (Paragraph 286)

The Government will always seek close cooperation with the US on a full range of issues. The US is an important ally across the RBIS, including – as the Foreign Secretary highlighted – in efforts to press for reform to make the system more effective. The global nature of the RBIS means that it is right that we work not only with our closest allies including the US, Commonwealth and European partners, but also with the widest possible group of countries with shared interests. In doing so, we strengthen the order by ensuring it remains relevant to the most pressing concerns of the international community.

43. The UK should be a vocal champion of reform to international institutions. It should support reforms both to make these institutions more efficient, and to give a greater voice to emerging powers—particularly China and India—to build their support for the rules-based international order. (Paragraph 287)

The Government is fully committed to reform of the UN and other international institutions to ensure that they are performing to the best of their abilities and delivering on their mandates while also offering value for money. The FCO Minister for the Commonwealth and the UN and FCO senior officials have been active in engaging other Foreign Ministers and UN officials on reform and helping to maintain support for the agenda and drive the implementation of reform.

As mentioned in relation to recommendation twenty seven, the Government agrees that others should have a greater voice at the UN and we have long supported a permanent Indian seat on the UN Security Council. The Government welcomes increased engagement in international institutions by a wider range of Member States, including the emerging powers. This must come with increased responsibilities, both moral and financial, to lead by example in terms of abiding by rules and norms and setting standards.

44. The Government's branding of Global Britain lacks clarity, and needs more definition to be an effective tool in the practical promotion of the UK's interests overseas. (Paragraph 311)

Global Britain is a signal of the UK's intent to maximise our presence, influence and impact as we leave the EU. Global Britain is not a brand; it is the combination of an overarching vision and the delivery framework for achieving this. Global Britain will focus on realising the opportunities to retain and strengthen our role as a medium sized global power. This means reinvesting in our relationships, championing the rules-based international order, using soft power to project our values and demonstrating that the UK is open, outward facing and confident on the world stage. The UK will lead on issues that matter; be an innovative and

inviting economy; and a normative power setting global standards that uphold our values while supporting our security and prosperity objectives.

45. The establishment of the National Security Council has had a beneficial effect on the coordination of Britain's external policies. But in the modern world economic issues are inextricably linked to those of national security and international relations. We therefore recommend that the Government should amend the remit of the NSC to include international economic issues. (Paragraph 312)

We agree that economic issues are linked to national security issues. In the SDSR 2015 we emphasised that our economic and national security go hand in hand. Economic security is a core part of the UK's national security agenda. This was further reinforced in the National Security Capability Review, published in March 2018, where the Government committed to using the Fusion Doctrine to integrate economic goals and capabilities throughout national security and identified Economic Security and Trade & Prosperity as a key theme.

The National Security Capability Review also set out a new collective approach to national security – the Fusion Doctrine. The Fusion Doctrine states that in an environment that is more complex and interconnected than ever before, we must be creative and joined-up in our approach and work towards shared objectives. This means that our security, influence and economic tools must be applied across security, influence and economic goals to reinforce one another. Few countries have a blend or balance of tools quite like the UK. We must make the most of this comparative advantage.

46. We welcome efforts by the Government to coordinate better the UK's internationally focused departments and break down siloes. The establishment of the Department for International Trade—and in particular the appointment of nine HM Trade Commissioners—has run counter to this initiative: it has further fragmented international policy and undermined the role of the FCO. We are concerned that this restructure may have undermined the support available to UK businesses seeking to trade internationally. A similar concern applies to the Department for International Development and the Home Office both of which need to take account of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's priorities in their work. (Paragraph 313)

We do not agree with this assessment. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office collaborates closely with the Department for International Trade, Department for International Development and the Home Office, as well as numerous other parts of government on a wide range of issues.

In British embassies and other overseas missions the Government pursues a 'One HMG' model whereby several government departments are typically present and working in close alignment, with Her Majesty's Ambassador responsible for overall leadership of the post. The nine HM Trade Commissioners represent an addition of commercial leadership and expertise into this structure, giving a clear focal point at a senior level to trade issues in overseas posts.

In the UK, there is continual engagement between departments on international policy, while the National Security Council structure provides a forum where effort can be aligned and tensions between governmental priorities resolved at the highest level of government.

Moreover, the Department for International Trade has championed working in a joined-up way across government departments, as evidenced by its active support of and contribution to the Industrial Strategy, and in its delivery of the Export Strategy. Together, these are creating an effective, coordinated approach to international trade and trading partners.

47. In particular, the Government should consider the concerns of its international partners when developing its new immigration policy, and take account of the impact of its approach to visas on the pursuit of its foreign policy goals. (Paragraph 314)

The Government has recently published its White Paper on the UK's future skills-based immigration system, which sets out proposals for a global, skills-based immigration system with user and business friendly visa arrangements. The Government does consider the impact on bilateral relationships and foreign policy objectives in determining the approach to visas and in developing its new immigration policy. This is because the approach to visas can be one of the issues that is raised most frequently and strongly by our international partners and where we need to balance the concerns of our international partners with other policy objectives. The FCO plays a role in providing advice on the likely impact of visa and immigration policy on our pursuit of foreign policy goals, based on insights from our overseas network and engagement with international partners. The FCO, working with the Home Office, has agreed to survey the overseas network to establish the extent and nature of concerns.

48. The UK should step up its engagement with international organisations of all sizes. It should seek to exercise its membership (and observer status) of global and regional institutions, to demonstrate and reinforce the value of multilateral co-operation between states. This means putting more effort and resources into both existing and new organisations. (Paragraph 321)

The Government has increased the UK's commitment to international organisations by increasing resources in our key multilateral posts, including New York (UN), Geneva (UN), Addis Abba (African Union), and a new ASEAN mission in Jakarta. We have recommitted ourselves to UNESCO and are pursuing potential membership of other, non-traditional organisations which will help to increase the UK's international reach as well as its engagement with an ever-increasing number of international partners. We will continue to consider how we can increase the impact of our engagement with existing and new organisations.

49. To maintain its influence and leadership on global issues, the UK needs a more agile, creative and entrepreneurial approach to foreign policy. It has an opportunity to demonstrate its value to old allies—such as the US—and other partners—such as India—by harnessing niche areas of UK expertise, such as cyber security and business and human rights. (Paragraph 322)

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office's Diplomacy 20:20 change programme underpins all the department's activity, ensuring that the FCO builds and expands into a more expert and

agile organisation, supported by a world class platform. The UK is a trusted and respected regulator, and the home of many key global standard setting organisations. In the face of rapidly changing new technologies, systems and business models it is important that we further develop UK capacity to play a prominent normative role shaping rules and standards. We will build on our historic convening role in this area leading the way on regulatory alignment and demonstrating our expertise in bilateral dialogues and in multilateral groupings such as the OECD, WTO, G20 and the International Financial Institutions. Meanwhile we will continue to develop our regulatory environment, to ensure the UK remains a top world-class destination for businesses and investors.

The UK harnesses areas of particular expertise to create world leading initiatives such as the active cyber defence initiative, previously referenced in our response to recommendation 21, which uses automation to reduce some of the most common weaknesses in cyber security defences. Our influencing power also aids us in delivering on issues that uphold core UK values which matter to the global public. This includes the campaign for media freedom announced by the Foreign Secretary which will involve a major conference later this year. We are also building expertise through the Diplomatic Academy, for example the new international trade faculty for Trade Commissioners and Trade Diplomacy policy officers and a refocus on improving languages. [Para 49]

50. Witnesses urged, and we agree, that the UK needs to be more active diplomatically to maintain its relevance in a world where power is becoming more diffuse, challenges are increasingly transnational and its longstanding ally—the US—is less aligned with its priorities. (Paragraph 330)

51. The Government must invest more in the UK's global diplomatic presence. To fulfil its responsibilities as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the UK should have a presence in every country. We therefore welcome the Foreign Secretary's recent commitment to open additional UK missions. (Paragraph 331)

52. Increased resources for diplomacy are urgently needed. The Government should reverse cuts to the FCO's budget, in recognition that a relatively modest uplift in funding would help to ensure the UK is able to deal with a more fluid and unstable geopolitical environment. The Government's formal spending commitments for development and defence are public statements of the UK's willingness to be present in capability, not just in name, and they should be matched with a commitment on funding for the new and far more intensive type of diplomacy needed worldwide to fulfil the UK's duties. (Paragraph 345)

In a shifting world order where international policy making occurs in an increasingly unstable environment, the Government agrees that it is vital the Foreign and Commonwealth Office receives sufficient resource to fund an ambitious diplomatic agenda.

New investment in the FCO's global network alongside a tech overhaul and our Corporate Capability Programme is creating a modern, efficient and agile FCO that champions UK interests and delivers an outward facing Global Britain to even more countries across the world. By the end of 2020, the network will gain over 1000 new positions alongside the opening of 14 new missions over the same period. This will extend the UK's reach and impact with sovereign missions in 161 countries, more than any other European country.

The broadening of the network and deepening of core political capability in existing posts will greatly enhance our ability to engage key countries and institutions, promote UK interests and contribute to global security and prosperity. For example new roles focused on digital and cyber issues in Beijing, Tokyo, Geneva and San Francisco will help us to remain ahead of the curve on matters related to global governance of rapidly evolving technologies, including in the field of Artificial Intelligence.

The 2018 National Security Capability Review launched the Fusion Doctrine which entails effective cross-departmental coordination and cooperation, to use the full range of assets and expertise across government more effectively.

53. We support the Government's commitment to spend 0.7% of Gross National Income on overseas development—which sustains and amplifies the UK's influence in many international organisations, including the UN—and ongoing fulfilment of its commitment to spend 2% of Gross Domestic Product on defence. (Paragraph 346)

54. But it is not just quantity that is important: the quality of development and defence spending also matters. The focus of the UK's development spending should now take account of the UK's old friends and new partners. In considering the defence budget, the size of the military does not necessarily determine the effectiveness of its foreign policy. (Paragraph 347)

We agree with this recommendation. Successive governments have made structural changes to ensure our diplomatic, defence, and development levers are working together to help tackle the global challenges of our time and also deliver value for money for the UK taxpayer. The 2010 National Security Strategy set out how the UK would deploy its world-class development programme to help improve security and the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) committed to use 30% of the ODA budget to support fragile and conflict-affected states. The 2015 International Development Act enshrined in to law the government's commitment to spend 0.7% of Gross National Income (GNI) on ODA and the 2015 UK Aid Strategy committed to ensure that our aid is targeted to deliver more effectively for the world's poorest and for the UK national interest. The 2018 National Security Capability Review took this further and explicitly linked development and national security.

The Prime Minister set out an ambitious new approach in her speech in Cape Town in August last year. The UK will put development at the heart of our international agenda, building co-operation across the world in support of the rules-based system. She made clear that acting in the national interest and doing global good was not a binary choice and she also signaled a new partnership between the UK and Africa. HMG will work together to implement this vision drawing on the different skills, expertise and experience we have across Government, including in the FCO, DFID and MOD.

55. Language skills are essential for the effective conduct of diplomacy and export growth. We welcome the Government's commitment to increasing the number of languages taught at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's Language School, but regret that it is unwilling to carry out an audit of language skills across Whitehall, and urge it to reconsider. Moreover, given the importance and interconnectedness of language skills and policy across so many government departments, including the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence, the Department for International Trade, the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and

the Department for Education, we recommend that the Government act more effectively to co-ordinate language strategy across government. (Paragraph 354)

We agree on the need for a more co-ordinated language strategy across government. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office and is working with other government departments such as the MoD, DfID and GCHQ, including through the cross-Whitehall Languages Group, to encourage more strategic and operational coordination. Caroline Wilson, FCO Europe Director, has been appointed as cross Whitehall Languages Champion and is working with academia and other government departments to raise languages up the cross-Whitehall agenda.

With regard to a language skills audit, we would be happy to provide the Committee with data on numbers of FCO officers who have FCO exam passes across all languages. The rollout of the FCO's new integrated Finance and HR system, Atlas, will enable us to audit skills across the FCO, including those which are self-declared (e.g. native speakers or officers who have acquired a language through informal routes). Currently, the FCO considers that it should be possible to complete a full skills audit by the end of 2020. A cross-Whitehall audit would require agreement by all relevant Departments. Such an audit could be worth considering as part of future cross-Whitehall work, especially in the context of the Cabinet Office's work to identify skills needed for civil servants following the UK's exit from the EU, but it would not be for the FCO to lead.

56. The Government should do more to encourage universities to restore modern foreign language degree courses, in order to ensure that the UK is producing a sufficient number of linguists to meet the country's foreign and trade policy needs. (Paragraph 355)

Higher Education provision is devolved in the UK. In England, we agree that learning foreign languages is important to providing a sufficient number of linguists to meet the country's foreign and trade policy needs. We believe that building the skills and demand for degree courses starts in schools. That is why we are taking a number of steps to support schools in encouraging uptake of language qualifications. We are supporting schools to increase languages take up through the £10 million Mandarin Excellence Programme and through a £4.8m modern foreign languages pedagogy pilot programme, which will improve uptake and attainment in languages at Key Stages 3 to 4, particularly for disadvantaged pupils.

We also introduced the EBacc performance measure in 2010 to halt the decline in the number of pupils taking GCSEs in the core academic subjects. The reformed National Curriculum now makes it compulsory for pupils in maintained schools to be taught a foreign language in Key Stage 2. On 3 December 2018, a leaflet was published on gov.uk aimed at parents who will be supporting their children as they make their choices for the GCSEs. The leaflet explains the benefits of taking the EBacc, which includes languages.

57. UK universities are a national industry of global importance, and a significant source of soft power. The Government's inclusion of students in its immigration target is wrong and deleterious both to the UK's international image and its ability to build a relationship with future leaders. We urge the Government to remove international students from its migration target, and to cease treating full-time undergraduate and postgraduate students as economic migrants for public policy purposes. (Paragraph 369)

Net Migration statistics are produced by the independent Office for National Statistics, who follow international best practice by including students. The statistics include students, as international students who stay for longer than 12 months, like other migrants, have an impact on communities, infrastructure and services while they are here.

In its recent report on International Students in the UK, the Migration Advisory Committee recommended that international students should not be removed from the net migration statistics and the Government has accepted this recommendation.

58. The UK has strong soft-power assets, but the Government must support and invest in them. This means not only the British Council, the BBC World Service and scholarship programmes but also training, skills, the professions, culture, legal activity and the creative industries. In this regard we welcome the Government's decision to develop a UK soft power strategy and the creation of a clearly identified soft power strategy team in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. (Paragraph 370)

The Government agrees with the Committee regarding the importance of UK soft power, and with the importance attached by the Committee to the work of the British Council, BBC World Service and to scholarship programmes as key contributors to our soft power, though agree too that soft power must be looked at in a much broader sense, encompassing the UK's values, culture and international behaviour. We are pleased with the welcome given to the Government's decision to develop a UK soft power strategy.

59. We believe the Government should further expand the main overseas scholarship programmes (Chevening, Commonwealth and Marshall) and also the British Council's Future Leaders Connect programme. (Paragraph 371)

Our international scholarship programmes are world class and support the development of deep and meaningful relationships with leaders all over the world. We continue to seek opportunities to maximise the value we get from our programmes and support wider priorities. In August last year The Prime Minister announced an uplift of £2.7M in funding for Chevening to offer up to an extra 100 places across Sub Saharan Africa to support the UK's renewed commitment in the region. The Commonwealth Scholarship Commission in the UK (CSC) awards scholarships and fellowships to Commonwealth citizens for postgraduate study and professional development. The UK Government agreed £82m of support to deliver 2,500 new awards over 2018/19 - 2020/21. There will be 770 new awards in 2018/19 and support for 950 students who are continuing their studies. As outlined in our response to recommendation two, we are currently undertaking a Tailored Review of the Marshall programme which will make recommendations on how we maximise the value we get from the programme and ensure its long terms success. We will report back to Parliament on the outcome of the Review in due course.

60. The best way for the UK to deter cyber-attacks is to develop its own offensive cyber capabilities, and make clear its ability and willingness to respond. We welcome the Government's relative openness in this area, and encourage it further to clarify its thinking in this respect. (Paragraph 387)

The National Security Strategy 2015 affirmed the UK's commitment to "use the full spectrum of our capabilities – armed force including, ultimately, our nuclear deterrent, diplomacy, law enforcement, economic policy, offensive cyber and covert means – to deter adversaries and

deny them opportunities to attack us.” The UK avowed that it has offensive cyber capabilities in November 2015 and we would use offensive cyber at a time and place of our choosing in accordance with national and international law.

A key element of deterrence is preventing cyber incidents in the first place thereby achieving deterrence by denial. The vast majority of cyber incidents can be prevented with good, basic cyber security measures, so the National Cyber Security Programme also focuses on developing the cyber security building blocks of awareness, skills and expertise across the UK in order to evidence our commitment to a strong cybersecurity posture.

61. We recommend that the Government should designate a Minister with responsibility for cyber issues across government, who would attend the National Security Council. (Paragraph 388)

The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Minister for the Cabinet Office has responsibility for overseeing cross-Government coordination on national security priorities, including the National Cyber Security Strategy and its associated programme. The Minister attends the National Security Council.

62. Countering propaganda is an increasingly important, but challenging, task in an increasingly digital environment where misinformation can be spread widely and instantaneously. In the new digital environment, disinformation campaigns and propaganda have become major instruments of international disruption. The UK has played a leading role in countering these false narratives, but the Government must also accept that there is more to be done to counter these threats. (Paragraph 389)

The Government takes the issue of disinformation, as well as wider online manipulation and online harms very seriously. Hostile actors are increasingly using disinformation to threaten and destabilise democracies by undermining trust in government institutions, the media and civil-society. We are working with our international partners and allies, as well as industry, civil society and the media to counter these efforts, whilst remaining true to our values. Our view is that a strong, plural media environment underpinned by freedom of expression is one of the best safeguards against disinformation. Only when journalists can work without fear of intimidation or threat can disinformation be effectively countered.

The Russian government persistently uses disinformation as a tool to destabilise its perceived enemies. This was evident in the sustained Russian disinformation campaign following the attack in Salisbury, Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and remains so with Russia’s destabilisation of east Ukraine and beyond. The UK is investing approximately £100m over five years through our Counter Disinformation and Media Development Programme to counter Russian disinformation internationally. The Russian government has a poor record of respecting freedom of expression, yet it enjoys a near monopoly over Russian language media across the post-Soviet space, which it uses to spread disinformation. It is as important as ever that Russian speakers, wherever they are, have a choice in the media they consume and are able to access reliable and objective information. It is also important that local, public and independent media serving Russian-speaking audiences can flourish.

63. Digital tools, such as social media, necessitate a constant upgrading of the techniques of diplomacy, well beyond traditional skills. We are pleased with the FCO's efforts to harness new technologies in its work. (Paragraph 390)

The government welcomes the Committee's conclusion that digital communication is a core aspect of diplomacy and recognition of the FCO's work to equip diplomats with the skills needed to undertake this work. A recent internal survey also concluded that social media is an essential tool of ambassadors' and that leaders in the organisation are fully integrating social media within their public diplomacy. The FCO's targeted digital communications training programme will continue to upskill diplomats and locally engaged officials to take full advantage of the opportunities digital diplomacy provides.

64. It is critical to ensure that the public understands and is supportive of the UK's foreign policy objectives. A strong domestic foreign policy narrative is needed to deliver this. This narrative needs to be led by Ministers, in particular by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, and propagated through all departments and agencies. We recommend that the National Security Council should add to its tasks the co-ordination of the Government in shaping this domestic narrative. (Paragraph 394)

We agree fully that it is critical the British public understand and support the UK's foreign policy objectives. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office plays the leading role in communicating the Government's work to promote and protect British interests overseas. It does so through a variety of channels, including through Ministers, Ambassadors, media, social media and stakeholder engagement. FCO communications activity directly supports National Security Council priorities. The FCO will continue to work closely with all Government departments and Ministers to ensure that the UK public are informed about the Government's policy. This will include working closely with the National Security Council on cross-Government coordination.

Conclusion

65. In a world where the UK's influence can no longer be taken for granted and where the shifts in economic and political power relationships are not working to our advantage, our inquiry has brought home to us that we will need a more agile, active and flexible diplomacy to handle our international relationships to ensure that we are in a stronger position to protect and promote our interests. (Paragraph 395)

66. We believe that this agenda cannot just be manufactured. It has to be built up layer by layer. There will always be critics of aspects of UK foreign policy. But agreement on broad aims, and on the facts of what is actually happening in a rapidly changing world, is achievable. This should be a sound basis for a constructive debate about which new paths the UK should take, and what assets and experience it should build in a new epoch. We hope our inquiry, with its conclusions, will help in that endeavour. (Paragraph 396)

These concluding paragraphs have been addressed in detail in the Government's responses to the 64 recommendations.