



INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE

UK FOREIGN POLICY IN CHANGED WORLD CONDITIONS INQUIRY¹

Record of the session held in partnership with the Atlantic Council in
Washington D.C., 15:30 – 18:00, Thursday 14 June 2018²

Members present: Lord Howell of Guildford (Chairman); Baroness Coussins; Lord Hannay of Chiswick, Lord Jopling; Lord Purvis of Tweed.

Staff present: Nicolas Besly, Clerk of Select Committees; Joseph Dobbs, Policy Analyst.

Witnesses:

1. Damon Wilson, Executive Vice President, Atlantic Council; Dr Jim Townsend, Adjunct Senior Fellow, Center for New American Security.
2. Dr Matthew Burrows, Director of the Foresight, Strategy, and Risks Initiative, Atlantic Council; Will Glass, Senior Intelligence Analyst at the Financial Systemic Analysis and Resilience Center (FSARC); The Hon. Franklin D. Kramer, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

Session I: The Transatlantic Alliance and NATO

The Chairman: How does the changing role of technology impact warfare and politics, and does America really see the world differently in the way it says it does?

Jim Townsend: Thank you for coming here. We need to have a lot more conversations about UK-US relations given all this change, we need to keep this conversation going. Is there something for us to worry about or is everything ok? I think we're all trying to figure that out, frankly. I think I can say everything is not ok, we can't just not worry about it. There have been times when that was the case in the history of our relationship that we just need to get past—that has happened before. What is different now is not one single issue or problem like Russia, it's more than that. Something that dates back to before Trump. There has been a lot of change, but what we have been able to do is adapt to that change, certainly as an alliance. In the Obama administration, there were changes, and they weren't looking at Europe in a negative way, but they were taking Europe for granted. Obama was a lot more focused on domestic things, not so much foreign defence policy, but when they did they were dealing with Asia, Russia, and the Middle East, and neglected Europe. Not only in terms of defence spending, but taking Europe for granted, until Putin went into Crimea, which made us feel

¹ <https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/lords-select/international-relations-committee/inquiries/parliament-2017/foreign-policy-changing-world/>

² The Committee is grateful to the Atlantic Council for hosting it in Washington, and for compiling this record. This record has been amended by the Committee's Secretariat and agreed by the Committee. While witnesses were given the opportunity to make amendments, it should be considered a representation of what was said rather than a verbatim transcript.



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back in the Cold War so there was a scramble to try to deal with it, but the change was already there. Trump has accelerated that change, going in a much different direction than Obama, acting on things people had talked about like NATO spending but now he's actually acting on these fringe things. Is this going to forever change our relationship or is it something we can swing back to a more traditional route with the next president? We can't know how permanent the damage is until more time goes by.

Damon Wilson: We are very pleased you are continuing this inquiry; these questions are very important. Offering a sense of what is happening right now in preparation for the NATO summit: you are here in the wake of an eventful G7 summit and the US tariffs against allies for national security reasons, Trump meeting with one of the most egregious human rights offenders, and now preparing the Administration for the NATO Summit. There is a question of when the Trump-Putin summit is going to happen? The NATO Summit should be to show the strength of our unity to any potential adversary. Many of our colleagues are arguing it is time to "pivot to the positive" about Trump's actions. We have some high drama unfolding over the next few months. Let's put this in context: there are huge changes happening in the world, and perceptions of America and our own vision of our role in the world. Like the possibility of great power conflict, acceleration of change fuelled by technology which can bring a dark side with it to, what is going to happen with autocracy and AI. Trump is putting an exclamation mark on the breakdown of the international order that took shape in the post-World War Two era and America's questioning of its role in the world. Trump vs. Obama, very different, but still a sense of over-reach of American engagement in the world. He is questioning/reversing the thought behind NATO, which used to be the best means for us to guarantee our own security—increased prosperity among our allies means more prosperity for us. Now this is under challenge. This is manifesting in NATO, with two arguments: our allies are taking advantage of us and is our alliance obsolete? What Trump is saying is actually a compelling and understandable set of concerns. This is based in a dystopian world view that comes out of the Oval Office that our allies are taking advantage of us, rather than a fundamental misunderstanding that it is an alliance structure unique to the US that is a power magnifier in terms of our role in the world, but he sees it as a drain on our resources which he is now backing it up with real policies in the Trump administration. We might see a more permanent US military presence in Eastern Europe as a response to Putin, it's about deterrence, and deterrence is about the psychological impact on your enemy, so we have to increase our military exercises etc. because of the uncertainty of what is happening right now. The NATO summit will focus on burden sharing issues, so how will Trump respond to that? Will he take credit for progress or criticize the lack progress towards the 2% GDP target?

Jim Townsend: When we say this is what Trump is saying and thinks, that doesn't mean that's what everyone is saying and thinks. We asked tourists what they think about NATO and we were expecting to get a lot of blowback, but we heard majority views very in favour of NATO and allies. It would not be correct to assume Trump's dystopian view is representative of the US as a whole—the bulk of the American people do not have that view.

The Chairman: You have touched on all the uncertainties more or less that worry us—challenges of defence payment, how can we be good allies, who is the enemy. All these things need attention if not repair, thank you very much for that. I think we have questions.

Baroness Coussins: You talked about all the great change happening right now, I wonder if you could say something about how you think NATO changed and can change proactively



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and take some of the sting out of the president's criticisms? How valuable would it be for there to be proactive NATO reforms?

Jim Townsend: I've been involved in NATO reform for many years. First point: in terms of NATO reform, it has to always be thinking about how they can do things better, because it would be so easy to go back in terms of inefficiencies. NATO adapts pretty quickly compared to other organizations. For example: NATO force posture in response to Crimea. Second point: change isn't so much about NATO as an institution as it is about change within the Allies. NATO depends on what Allies bring to the Alliance—military resources, permanent representatives, ambassadors, people who can answer questions about the root causes. We need people to bring their best people, staff and military forces. I've seen in so many NATO operations—when it's go time, we find suddenly all these military problems where nations aren't ready. They run out of ammunition, or we don't have the right people. In conflict, this comes out, and can be traced to Allies who don't do enough at home. We need to bring people who can address the pressing issues and we need nations who do their part.

Damon Wilson: There is a need to demonstrate that the Alliance can move and react. The strength has to do with political unity. When we don't politically agree on something, it makes effective reforms pretty difficult. It's not about the structure as much as it is about the unity of the members. Regarding NATO force in the east, NATO-Russia agreements were made with a very different Russia posture, now there is an over-fear of provoking Russia as opposed to reassuring our allies. We need something that focuses on the east and south in order to demonstrate our ability to succeed— NATO has just accepted Montenegro, and Macedonia is on the table now. NATO with the EU can show its ability to stabilize in the east, and this is an important demonstration about its relationship with the EU.

Lord Hannay of Chiswick: It's important to emphasise it hasn't been a shift for the better since Trump took office—I think you underestimate the harm that could happen within the Alliance. Trump has a doctrine of disruption about his relationships with his allies. I don't think that's a good approach. I think they will be likely to join up against Trump. I don't know what the answer is, but I think Trump's disruption is really damaging. If we look at the history of the Alliance, the US has been a key player. American leadership has played a pivotal role. But Trump has no idea of where he wants to lead the Alliance: he has said tons of negative things about the Alliance, lots of positive things about Putin which is confusing because Russia has been taken out of the G7 because it broke international law. Do you think he can improve at all or lead in any positive way? Can you give us any hope at all?

Jim Townsend: We have learned about how to deal with Trump as president, and all of us looked on him in the normal, regular way you look on a president, as they would moderate their actions being out of the campaign and being advised by more specialized experts, and help him toe a more centrist line, and have a way of dealing with partners that was more familiar. So, we judged him on that template. But by now, for most of us, we see how wrong we were in that perception of Trump. What we found out, over last year and into this year, he has shed the advisors that would have pushed him to the middle, and brought in people who think like him—of like mind to him. We've also seen someone who has broken free of the shackles that have been put on him—not only on Twitter, but to say what he wants. For example, North Korea. We've seen a president that has surprised his closest staff, with a letter saying [the meeting] wasn't happening. It's obvious he is just doing what he wants to do. We are getting used to someone breaking all the moulds which is something we haven't



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dealt with before. As we look for the next two years, the only thing we know is that we are going to be surprised. He is not going to become more predictable with time, he is going to be increasingly calling the shots. We can't allow him to destroy him. Finally, he comes into this job with no background, unschooled. He doesn't want to learn, or read, or have anyone tell him background. It's not an ideology, it's just opportunism, or the fate of issues coming together that hurts our allies. It wasn't something he set out for in a predictable way, it's other things that make him act that way, and the fallout comes on our allies. We are dealing with someone we don't recognize, he is not predictable, he does things not based on a thought through approach, but someone who just reacts. He doesn't set out to damage people, but he hurts people who aren't even relevant (our allies). Not because they're our allies, but because they got in the way of where he is on trade. There's not an advisor telling him to do these things, this is just someone who has a particular view of the world that Damon laid out—he is a bull in a china shop.

Lord Jopling: When Jim said NATO adapts quickly, I almost burst out laughing. I am very concerned about the lack of dynamism in those in Brussels who run the organisation who seem to not have come up to the mark in so many ways. There are three examples. First, the flavour of NATO of the last few months has been transferring military assets within Western Europe—issues with infrastructure and paperwork. Suddenly now this has become a great issue—what has been happening the past 6 years? I went to a NATO exercise for nations who can't cope with great catastrophes, and there had been ambulances, all sorts of emergency kits which had been taken down to Croatia—10 or 12 years ago. I was told then they had great difficulty moving these to Croatia for exactly the reasons you pointed out, but no change has come. Secondly, the new headquarters: they made that plan in 1999, they intended to move in in 2015, but they only just started in 2018 to move in. Thirdly, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly has only just started exercising ability to order people to explain their actions/use their parliamentary powers. Auditors: serious accusations, I asked them questions about it. When we had someone from NATO, they said, "we're still waiting for a reply," same with NATO Deputy Secretary—he ignored issue of the auditors' report. I despair about this outfit—why is this not a major issue that is going to be talked about in Brussels?

Jim Townsend: The auditors, I'm familiar with the process. We didn't use to have audits. NATO in terms of its adaptations, there are things that NATO is doing today that it wasn't doing before. We made a lot of differences to the NATO force structure, and things in response to Crimea. Why did we have to go through such an adaptation though? Why were we not prepared? Because nations of the West, including US and UK—after the Berlin Wall fell no one thought we would potentially be fighting Russia in eastern Europe, that wasn't the thinking, we thought we would get at least a 10-year warning about when that would happen. We were wrong, as we frequently are about these things. Nations weren't even keeping up with defence spending especially after the 2008 crash, so nations weren't capable of answering a Russian threat and also didn't feel they needed to be. We were also caught up in global war on terror especially US, we were many different places our attention was diverted away from a threat we thought was low risk with the Russians. We had to go from doing counterinsurgency to dealing with military large-scale military. That made 2014 and the Wales and Warsaw summits critical to get us back to where we need to go. Regarding the EU deterrence initiative, there is now \$7 billion to put US forces back in Europe. We had great NATO leaders then and moved very quickly then and so did all our allies, we will see these adaptations continue, and more US military in eastern Europe. We are readier now than we used to be to meet a Russian threat. The fact that we are here now and Russia hasn't invaded



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Estonia is great but we can't sit easy—we still have a lot to do. But your point is well taken, you raise important points, and a lot of institutional reform has to continue each year. But in terms of military adaptability, we have a lot to do, and each ally has a lot they need to do—it's up to the nations and the allies, not NATO as a structure itself.

Lord Purvis of Tweed: Thank you. I have a little of anxiety that the if part of the success of the Summit is based on simply the percentage of funding element rather than counting what you've analysed as problem with the president. You will be provided justification that his approach is correct and denying reality. According to NATO figures, the US's contribution has been more than \$100 billion less than in 2010 for understandable reasons. Canada's and Europe's contribution was \$6 billion more. So, focusing solely on that element, what is your advice to do about how that's approached? The second component, the dominance of the US within the Alliance, we need a more equal relationship in NATO to make sure there is unity because the principal actor is being so difficult. Will it have to change culturally about how it will operate?

Jim Townsend: Not positive about the numbers you are referring to, but Trump hasn't gotten his head around how NATO funding works. He thinks it's like a club where you pay dues—but it's not. But the percent is about the nation's defence spending, which in the US has been going up. This is just defence spending, not defence within NATO. Certainly, beginning in 2014 at the Wales Summit, we have stopped the drop in defence spending in each nation (except maybe Belgium) and we are nearing eight nations being at the two per cent. The critical point here in terms of the numbers we have, the numbers are going up now—it took Putin to do that. We have to keep this sustained spending going up, that's got to happen. At the Summit, it's got to be more substance than the two per cent. This year, the Summit is different, it's not just about the individual initiatives, but about the unity that we are going to have to show. Intra-Europe unity too—Russia needs to see our unity. That is the key deliverable for the summit, we can't make it about the 2% and we can't have the snapping at each other that we had at the G7.

Lord Purvis of Tweed: It will have to be a four-year trend, and that's going to be a tough. Will Trump just take credit for the upward trend in defence spending?

Jim Townsend: It makes it hard for countries if the argument comes from Donald Trump.

Damon Wilson: Decisions to increase defence spending in Europe could actually be opposite, because Europe isn't sure they can rely on the US. We shouldn't measure the success of our alliance of the 2%, but with Trump, it's what success probably looks like to him. That's his reality, which is the challenge we are facing. I think there is a power to the habit of co-operation that is good from a multilateral organization and military exercises conducted in that way. The enmeshment of our establishment is greater than any one leader—the whole point of integrated military command. I value the multilateral interaction that comes together, even as there is a huge priority on sustaining the bilateral relationship, especially in DC, to the detriment of the EU. To the previous point of concern about the reforms, we do have to be aware of problems of bureaucracy and issues like those which matter a great deal at international organizations. And yet, while I share some of these concerns, NATO is almost a gold standard compared to the UN, the WHO, the EU—the bureaucratic culture that exists in those institutions is even worse there. But yes, the NATO building construction was egregious but maybe has to do with construction in Belgium. This is a small organization on



the substantive level (100 people) it's night and day compared to the EU and the UN. Not to make excuses, there must be accountability.

The Chairman: The messages I see, you are reminding us of the foreground of Trump of how he behaves and he acts. But in the background, we still see the move of these tectonic plates presenting new challenges, and the relationship of the US with its allies in this connected world. What about the leadership cliché of the US: we have to accept it or stand back, or is it more a connection of partnership in a network world? Does it require each node of the network to work? Like China related and ASEAN related, might soon be able to take on the West. Probably issues we will look at in the next session but thank you so much for the insights you have shared with us.

Session 2: The Impact of New Technologies on Global Security

The Chairman: So how does the impact of new technologies on global security look on this side of the Atlantic?

Matthew Burrows: I spent many years in government and in the intelligence community doing global trends at CIA³ and NIC⁴ which is put out every four years. Yes, it's very confusing, but I do think that knowledge and understanding trends and scenarios is empowering for us in maintaining order. There are some big themes: we've spent a lot of time thinking about individual empowerment, bubbling up from below, trying to understand new power from everything from 'Me Too' to 'We Work'. I think that exists and is mostly a good trend. We should not forget that in terms of education we're seeing trends where, between boys and girls, access to education is opened to both. We've seen the end of extreme poverty in most of the world. We've seen life expectancy grow faster than any time before. It's still the most democratic age yet. Living in a media-dominated age, I think you have to first look at the good side and remember that the more I see women being empowered, see more AI, see more education and better education—those are good trends. All those trends have unintended consequences. I don't see this as the end of the state era. If anything, particular looking at tech, if it's cyber, obviously on conventional weaponry we still have a huge advantage. We should be on guard against non-state actors, but it's still very much a world of states and part of some states—China leading the way—sovereignty is a big theme. I think the worry I would have is that a lot of other states believe that state capitalism is better than liberal capitalism as a model to develop. The more that we have problems in our own democracy on both sides, I think it sends a message that China is the way to go. The other way where we have fallen down is development. There is a real need for real infrastructure. The West has been absent on that issue. We don't have a message other than don't deal with China which I don't think is the solution. We don't have yet an alternative program that we can put out there on the table. I think you know this is not a doom and gloom picture. But it's also not an uplifting view of the world. We have to get a better grip on it, and also get beyond—get more beyond the news cycle, which just goes from one tweet to the next.

The Chairman: Thank you for that. The heart of government, we're finding your overview about changing security situation, and what we should be worrying about. Please don't hesitate to put questions back to us.

³ The Central Intelligence Agency

⁴ The National Intelligence Council



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The Hon. Frank Kramer: I won't repeat anything from the previous session, but I think Damon's and Jim's points were very well taken. Let me expand. I think one of the obvious points is the rest of the world makes a bigger difference than used to be the case. The US has been involved in Pacific for a long time, but it's become more consequential. I was in the Carter Administration, which undertook Camp David but one of the important things was the continued opening to China and normalizing relations, and China has become even more important. I think the world is made up more now of series of networks that are interacting, and a state is a key element in many of the networks but so are the non-states actors. For example, in security issues, non-state actors are more engaged—financially engaged and in security and economic-related activity along with critical infrastructure. The world faces more different types of risks than it ever did. People could always attack critical infrastructure, but before it was during war. Now it's at risk every day. According to the DHS⁵ and the FBI⁶ announcements, Russia has penetrated basically the US energy and electric industries and has cyber intrusion inside them. What we see is a much greater degree of vulnerability caused by state actors and non-state actors, and we really haven't come to grips with that yet. We've built a lot of wooden houses, but not fire codes. So, if a fire starts, we are at risk. We have a lot of new tech...but there is no clarity as to what that will mean. Cyber has gotten the most attention, but also, for example, the possibility of gene editing and creating bio organisms. That's a real problem. We have no ways to control that right now. Also, right now we haven't seen any very major bad actions from new technologies, but the problems are out there. We have a lot of positive opportunities that are quite magical. The positives are out there as much as negatives. We've also seen disinformation. The long tail concept says that companies could go out to the end of the spectrum and market to each person and now the bad guys can do that too. We're only first trying to figure out how to deal with that. There's a dispute as to whether Russian actions impacted our election or not, but we certainly know they did make an effort as the intelligence community has said. Apparently, in connection with Brexit and Catalonia as well. However, we still don't really have an approach to deal with it. Where I come out is that we need to think hard to expand the concept of networks in a positive way. Institutions we have are good; they're purpose-built. You'll hear frequently from some NATO members that NATO is a military organization and shouldn't be involved in other kinds of action, but we've made progress, though there is much more to do. In the Pacific, the arrangements we have are not quite as established. The US is working to engage the Indo-Pacific. What the content is has yet to be determined. How do we need to work together? For example, there's not clarity as to what private sector needs to do to support activities. Also, there is a systemic incompatibility with much of what China does and says it wants to do. We have to figure out what to do with the Chinese. There is a new whole set of issues with a whole new set of challenges. Deterrence of Russia is different but more straight forward. Problems that exist with new tech, the impact of the private sector and empowerment of non-state actors makes it for a different world, and that's a major change from the turn of the millennium.

Will Glass: We need to back up a little bit and think about this. When we think about intersection between emerging tech and global security, we can look at global history as two forces: first, the erosion of state control with power concentration in the private sector; and second, the clawing back of power. The pendulum has swung back and forth and national

⁵ The Department for Homeland Security

⁶ The Federal Bureau of Investigation



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priorities have shifted. Government has seen control of technology get upended. You've got nations developing cyber capabilities that on balance outweigh their power to project in physical domain. The locus of power has shifted. Governments find themselves unable to change quickly enough. This shift causes an accelerated reduction of faith in institutions. Others are providing things that used to be provided by the government. Governments responded in force. Advanced techno nationalism abrades against the vision of order-less free flow nature of the internet. This is causing significant implications of commerce human rights more broadly. Tensions can be managed better with communications and understandings from the private and government side. The traditional Westphalian principle of the globe is currently under stress. There is a massive network without borders. It is critical both sides work together.

Lord Purvis of Tweed: Following up from point, your emphasis on rise of the world that is more powerful, institutions broadly are not prepared then where there has been a shift in influence. There could be a mass effort in this situation, which may not go anywhere. Do you think it's worth engaging that debate or codifying emerging networks to threats and opportunities of which, if we do not take, we've seen examples of vacuums filled?

The Hon. Frank Kramer: There is a place for adaptation for current institutions, and the creation of some new ones. We have to do this with some clear idea of whom we are engaging. To be clear, the Chinese are not always our friends, but they exist and they are powerful and there are some things we can do with them, but not everything. That's also true with the Russians, particularly under their current government which will likely go on for a while. We have real questions whether or not you can build good institutions including multiple entities some that have converging and some that have diverging interests. And then we have groups of entities—public and private—with different ways of looking at things. The private ones are generally not focused on national security questions. They're generally focused on making a profit. It's a world where that may not be enough—when everything is about shareholder value—national security may need to be included in at least some private sector calculations. I think there's a huge amount of opportunity but a lot of hard work to be done, and there will be a lot of yelling. Sometimes you have to assert your positions strongly. As an example of what might be done differently, perhaps in the Indo-Pacific, the perimeter countries—India, Indonesia, Australia, Canada, US, Korea, and Japan—ought to engage formally or informally. That would be a new group, and it might also bring in and encourage the private sector to work with them. That would be different, but that doesn't mean that we would get rid of ASEAN or other institutions. We do have to think about new things. On cyber we need a true DARPA⁷-type rethink of underlying technologies and processes, as the current system gives too much power to negative actors. I think we really need major changes and to use technology to advance lots of changes.

Baroness Coussins: We've spoken to other people who express conflicting views on regulation of the cyber world over it being managed through a legal framework and others who say we need new legal institutions. Where you stand on that? Who do you think should be taking the lead? And given the nature of the beast, do you think there is a chance of regulation of the cyber world being effective?

⁷ The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency—an agency of the US Department of Defence



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Will Glass: In most of my readings, much of the UN charters mention armed attack giving a nation the right to defend itself. That's a different concept to define in cyber space. So, to operate in that framework would define what a cyber weapon is, if you believe they exist. Frank might use a tool to break into a computer and steal your social security number, I'm using the same tool to make sure that won't happen. Another point: there's been discussion about Geneva conceptions of companies to not enable state sponsored espionage. Looking at the differences between the physical world, it's easy to go visit a nuclear facility, but with my phone in my pocket, I can build a pretty sophisticated weapon that's hard to verify. So, does that mean nations will cheat on the rules because they assume everyone else is cheating? We need to change the language of our laws to make sure people are doing what they are supposed to be doing but I see it difficult to get that kind of consensus on the global scale but might be more possible on the regional basis.

The Hon. Frank Kramer: NATO decided a couple of years ago that cyberattack can fall under Article 5—we didn't define how much harm but it was more the consequences and the resulting politics and geopolitics. The Chinese and the Russian don't agree with that. If we move into below Article 5 – that is the hybrid area – under that, there are several things to think about. Stolen information, disruptions, etc. There's a lot of international law that is relevant that lets you, if you are attacked, take action against the attacking party—we have to apply those concepts to the cyber area, not just operational cyber but the whole area of information. In the information world, China and others assert their right to their firewall—keeping information out. Now, the US needs to keep foreigners' improper actions out of our elections so Facebook and Google now have to pay close attention. What we see are developing concepts, not laws yet, but I think there will be further restrictions, perhaps like strong laws in Germany against hate speech and terrorism. We will see this more in Western countries but probably only on issues like hate speech and terrorism. One other idea, which two colleagues and I have suggested is establishing an 'International Cyber Stability Board' of like-minded countries: it doesn't exist yet but we have raised the issue. The need for like-minded to work together is illustrated by the fact that we were not able to get agreement at the UN group of experts about cyber norms.

The Chairman: Mr. Burrows, do you want to add anything?

Matthew Burrows: On cyber or more generally? No, I'll leave it there.

Lord Jopling: I just want to follow up—the British Foreign Secretary spoke recently of his concern about what a NATO response might be to a strong cyberattack. Would it be under Article 5? Not about whether Russia and China agree because they aren't in NATO, but what would make it worth that level of response?

The Hon. Frank Kramer: I think a lot of people are thinking about that, it's not on the agenda for the July Summit, but by way of example I was at NATO last June, and I talked on some of those issues. There's a lot of thought being given on that and they have a lot of planning that needs to be put into place, what the possible triggers for action need to be thought through—responses do not always have to be the most serious response but can be graduated responses. We also need to have a clarifying policy of the types of things that would lead to responses; we don't need a red line but we should have responses in our pocket and we would undertake proportionate responses in the event of an attack that called for them.



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Lord Hannay of Chiswick: I'm not sure I find it sufficient that doing things about cyber on a wider basis with countries like China and Russia is too difficult or too complicated, etc. All the problems are there but I keep thinking about what happened on nuclear after World War Two—developing NATO's doctrine for their use while Russia developed their doctrine and so did China etc., and we didn't think more about that until we had mutually assured destruction. That's not necessarily good, but we can't just keep saying working with them is too difficult and non-verifiable, lest we find ourselves back in a Mutually Assured Destruction kind of way and it's too late. But I want to talk about other powers becoming more important—China and Russia. Can we assume that China will always be our adversary? There are certain traits of their foreign policy that are not totally advisable. They seem willing to be a stakeholder on trade, the environment, peacekeeping... it seems they are conflicted because they will ignore the laws they don't like, like law of the sea, but I think they are still capable of being involved in assisting in international affairs. Russia seems a lot more problematic. It seems hard to get Putin on board for anything but even during the Cold War we did things with Russia, but Putin is a spoiler. Is that the right picture? And finally, the other powers: Brazil, India, Indonesia—are we right in thinking that none of those powers will become global powers in the foreseeable future? Is it just way, way down the road? Are they just going to remain regional powers? Does this picture make sense to you?

The Hon. Frank Kramer: Broadly speaking, when I was first in government, President Carter started off the Camp David agreements—with the recognition that “it's your enemies who you really have to talk to.” I'm a defence person, I believe in security but I also believe in dialogue. We need to talk to our enemies in a respectful but straightforward way. Relating to China and Russia is a good idea, but not a dialogue just for dialogue's sake, but to have a responsible agenda. More broadly, I think that it's a world in which the Russians and the Chinese are not going to go away. We need to find common ground on which to move forward, but we can't assume common ground. Issues with respect to the Chinese have to be more particularized, it's not all good or all bad. Belt and Road has questionable political and debt implications, but from point of view of infrastructure for the countries without it, it can be pretty good. But it needs a differentiated approach, it's not something easy to work with. Calls for reciprocal trade are appropriate and while the Chinese are not free traders, that doesn't mean you can't try to figure it out. If you can't do it on day one, you can do it on day two.

Matthew Burrows: Generally, I agree with Frank. I think part of it is our own problem that we need to realize that this world isn't just going to be determined by the West—this is a psychological problem we are living through which is why we are kind of having a reaction to what was seen as Obama giving away too much. I think you have to build up some forums I think the G20 is promising, I think they can be actually some good allies to the US because they are worried about a domineering China the way other countries are worried about a domineering US. We need to be careful that we don't appear to be keeping China down because there is a wide spread assumption in China that that is what we are doing and that war is the inevitable outcome.

Will Glass: In terms of a Mutually Assured Destruction situation, we are looking for the lines, we have not found the line where the attacked nation feels like they're able to respond. It might be stealing confidential information on huge scale, taking down the financial scale like stopping banks from stopping money, or nuclear power plant to fail (probably more consensus that this is war). We need to make sure we are talking about same kind of activity, and we



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are looking for a single solution but we might need more than one. There is a question about upcoming powers—the rise of the rest—using cyber capabilities to bolster their own power.

The Chairman: at the end of these discussions, I'm always left with a list of questions. What if a peaceful country finds itself (Switzerland) weaponized on all sides/taking advantages of institutions. What do we do about the fact that we can't see these problems coming? We don't know what form they are going to take? India is of great interest to us, it seems a rising force changing Asia policy, could stop China or at least match it but now India is becoming close to China. Is China entirely an adversary? We need the Chinese in a lot of areas, the US is one of China's biggest markets, and Russia too although we are not on good terms. Syria: Russia's aim is to keep Assad in power and ours is for him to lose it. But we still are going to need to work together at some point. Is security just defence but also airport security, surveillance, drug control, people control, etc. If the aim is to protect our citizens, then we might need to talk about 10% instead of 2%. NATO will not be able to solve all of these things but thank you so much for this discussion.