Title: False or Misleading Information Offence
IA No: 6106

Lead department or agency: Department of Health
Other departments or agencies: Impact Assessment (IA)

Date: 8/05/2013
Stage: Final
Source of intervention: Domestic
Type of measure: Primary legislation
Contact for enquiries:

Summary: Intervention and Options

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost of Preferred (or more likely) Option</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Net Present Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£0.7m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Net Present Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net cost to business per year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(£EANCB on 2009 prices)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In scope of One-In, One-Out?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measure qualifies as</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What is the problem under consideration? Why is government intervention necessary?
Health and social care providers often have access to more information on their service provision and quality of care than other parties in the system. The public, commissioners and regulators rely on providers of NHS care to share this information and ensure that it is accurate. There are incentives for providers to supply false or misleading information if otherwise it indicates their service quality is poor; e.g. to preserve its reputation and avoid consequences from regulators, commissioners and service users. Misleading information can undermine commissioning and regulation and can prevent issues being identified, lessons being learnt and corrective action been taken. This can enable poor care to manifest and spread.

What are the policy objectives and the intended effects?
The policy objective is to deter providers from deliberately supplying false or misleading information to the public, regulators and commissioners, and to hold those who do to account. The intended effects are to improve transparency and confidence in the supply and publication of such information, allowing identification of service issues and corrective interventions to be taken earlier. The result of which could prevent future incidents of poor care, and improve the quality of care in general, through better provider internal control, better patient choice, and better commissioning and regulation. It would also mean providers could be held fully accountable for misleading the public, regulators and commissioners.

What policy options have been considered, including any alternatives to regulation? Please justify preferred option (further details in Evidence Base)
Option 1: False or Misleading Information Criminal Sanction: Introduce a criminal offence for health and social care providers who supply or publish false or misleading information, targeted through subsequent regulations on certain types of information - such as mortality rates and waiting times data - supplied by secondary care providers.

Option 2: Do nothing. Providers would still be under a duty to comply with information requests with accurate information. However, the current provisions for offences, the consequences and mechanisms of accountability would continue to be insufficient in scope and/or provide an insufficient deterrent against supplying or publishing false or misleading information.

Will the policy be reviewed? If applicable, set review date: Month/Year

Does implementation go beyond minimum EU requirements? N/A
Are any of these organisations in scope? If Micros not exempted set out reason in Evidence Base.

Micro Yes < 20 Yes Small Yes Medium Yes Large Yes

What is the CO₂ equivalent change in greenhouse gas emissions? (Million tonnes CO₂ equivalent)

Traded: N/A Non-traded: N/A

I have read the Impact Assessment and I am satisfied that (a) it represents a fair and reasonable view of the expected costs, benefits and impact of the policy, and (b) that the benefits justify the costs.

Signed by the responsible Minister: Earl Howe
Date: 8 May 2013
Summary: Analysis & Evidence

Policy Option 1

Description: False or Misleading Information Offence

**FULL ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Price Base Year</th>
<th>PV Base Year</th>
<th>Time Period Years</th>
<th>Net Benefit (Present Value (PV)) (£m)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Low: £0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High: -£1.8m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Best Estimate: -£0.7m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**COSTS (£m)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Transition (Constant Price)</th>
<th>Average Annual (excl. Transition) (Constant Price)</th>
<th>Total Cost (Present Value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>£0.00</td>
<td>£0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>£0.2</td>
<td>£1.8m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best Estimate</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>£0.08</td>
<td>£0.7m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Description and scale of key monetised costs by ‘main affected groups’**

There will be costs to the Crown Prosecution Service and HM Courts and Tribunals Service of prosecutions brought under this new offence. It is expected that the scope of the offence will be limited to around 500 providers and few of these will commit the offence. It is assumed that around 0 - 5% of providers would be investigated and prosecuted. Providers that are prosecuted will face the legal costs of mounting a defence.

**Other key non-monetised costs by ‘main affected groups’**

Some providers may change their behaviour in response to this new offence and may spend more time and resource on complying with information requests; these are necessary costs that should already have been incurred. Further there may be some distraction costs for providers involved in legal action. Another organisation may need to assist the Crown Prosecution Service with investigations and prosecutions; this will have resource implications.

**BENEFITS (£m)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Transition (Constant Price)</th>
<th>Average Annual (excl. Transition) (Constant Price)</th>
<th>Total Benefit (Present Value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Unquantified</td>
<td>Unquantified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Unquantified</td>
<td>Unquantified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best Estimate</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Unquantified</td>
<td>Unquantified</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Description and scale of key monetised benefits by ‘main affected groups’**

It has not been possible to monetise any benefits.

**Other key non-monetised benefits by ‘main affected groups’**

The information available to the public, service users, commissioners and regulators should be of a higher quality, as providers who would have been complying with information requests with false or misleading information are deterred from doing so. This makes health care provision more transparent. In addition, it will allow providers of NHS care to be held to account if they have mislead the public and the system.

**Key assumptions/sensitivities/risks**

Discount rate (%): 3.5

It is not possible to know how provider behaviour will change in response to the new offence. They could take: a "bare minimum" approach, more time than necessary, and/or include numerous caveats that hinder interpretation. This could adversely affect, rather than improve, transparency. It is not possible to know how many providers would be investigated and prosecuted under the proposed offence nor the resources required per prosecution; any estimates are based on assumptions.

**BUSINESS ASSESSMENT (Option 1)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direct impact on business (Equivalent Annual) (£m):</th>
<th>In scope of OIOO?</th>
<th>Measure qualifies as</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Costs: N/A</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefits: N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net: N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Evidence Base

Policy Background

1. Providers of health and social care are required to share management and performance information with regulators, commissioners and the public. This data and information forms a vital basis of commissioning decisions, regulatory assessments on quality of safety and providers’ own monitoring and controls.

2. Providers of health and social care may supply information routinely through central data collection systems, such as Hospital Episode Statistics, or directly to the requesting body such as regulators or commissioners. Providers are required to provide accurate and truthful information.

3. The Public Inquiry into the role of the commissioning, supervisory and regulatory bodies in the monitoring of the Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust from January 2005 to March 2009 concluded recently. The final report highlighted issues of inaccurate information and the role of this in the lack of action to investigate issues with care, both within the Trust and from other bodies.

The evidence base of this impact assessment is structured as follows:

Section A: Definition of the underlying problem and rationale for government intervention
Section B: Policy objectives and intended effects
Section C: Description of the options
Section D: Costs and benefits assessment of the options (including specific impacts)
Section E: Summary of specific impact tests
Section F: Summary and conclusion

A: Definition of the underlying problem and rationale for government intervention

4. Health and social care providers often have access to more information on their service provision and quality of care than other parties in the system. To correct this, providers of NHS care are required to share this information and comply with requests from regulators and commissioners. However, there are incentives to provide false or misleading information if otherwise it indicates its service quality is poor.

5. Where a provider is identified as providing poor care it may face a range of consequences from reputation damage to regulatory enforcement action. Provision of poor care may mean service users and commissioners may choose to use alternative providers which would impact on its income streams. In addition, poor care may see a provider subject to enforcement action by the regulators which may range from a warning, to service or provider closure, to a fine and/or prosecution. These consequences provide incentives for providers to purposefully distort or omit information that indicates potential service issues.

6. Data and information forms a vital basis of commissioning decisions, regulatory assessments on quality of safety and providers’ own monitoring and controls. False or misleading information can enable poor and dangerous care to manifest and prevent regulatory or other corrective interventions to address the poor care. It can also prevent lessons being learnt and disseminated across the system.

7. There is evidence that providers may minimise, omit, or cover up information and data which highlights issues with services, and/or may not exercise due diligence, and this can adversely impact care. For example, the Francis Inquiry found that the Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation
Trust made inaccurate statements about its mortality rates\(^1\), although Francis does not state that the Trust did this deliberately. The inaccurate statements about mortality rates delayed any investigation and thus identification of service issues. As a result corrective action was delayed and poor quality care was allowed to continue unchecked. It is estimated that many more people than expected died at Mid Staffordshire Hospital. There were a number of factors involved but provision of inaccurate information by the Trust was a key component in enabling this to occur.

8. Providers are already required and expected to provide accurate information when complying with a statutory obligation. The Health and Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC) already has the power under the Health and Social Care Act 2012 to publish its assessment of the quality of information it collects from providers against agreed information standards. However, this is an assessment of the quality of information only (e.g. its completeness) and does not identify or investigate whether the information may have been falsified. If information collected by the HSCIC appears to be unusual or inaccurate, it is normally returned to the provider to be corrected and resubmitted. There is currently no direct penalty for providing false or misleading information to HSCIC.

9. There are existing offences that deal with the supply or publication of false or misleading information, or more specifically false statements and false representations, such as section 2 of the Fraud Act 2006, section 19 of the Theft Act 1968 and section 5 of the Perjury Act 1911. However, the Fraud Act and Theft Act provisions address a specific type of behaviour (i.e. making a gain or loss, and deceiving members or creditors, respectively) that is not relevant to this policy problem. In addition, all three provisions are fault-based offences (rather than strict liability). The new provision is to apply only to corporate bodies, not to individuals. The threshold required to prove the intent to provide false or misleading information, in the form of a “directing mind”, as required to prove a fault-based offence against a corporate body, would make it difficult to bring successful prosecutions in the instances considered here. As such, a fault-based offence would not provide a sufficient deterrent. Further, these Fraud Act and Perjury Act offences are applicable to both corporate bodies and individuals, whereas the Theft Act offence is applicable to individual officers only. In all three provisions, the penalties include imprisonment, which is not an appropriate penalty for a corporate body.

10. The Health and Social Care Act 2012 makes provision to extend aspects of the Competition Act 1998 and the Enterprise Act 2002. As a result, there is already statutory provision for a criminal offence of providing false or misleading information to Monitor, but only in relation to certain (e.g. Monitor’s “competition functions”), but not all, of Monitor’s functions. These provisions do not extend to other statutory obligations to provide information to other regulators, commissioners, the Secretary of State or HSCIC.

11. In summary, the current provisions for offences, the consequences and mechanisms of accountability are an insufficient deterrent and/or insufficient in scope to address the provider incentives outlined above. The Inquiry into Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust recommended that there should be a statutory duty on directors of healthcare organisations to be truthful in any information given to a health care regulator or commissioner, either personally or on behalf of the organisation, where given in compliance with a statutory obligation.\(^2\) To achieve this, the first step is to introduce an offence that allows prosecution of the corporate body, this is assessed here. Extending similar sanctions to individuals, such as board members, will be considered in due course – this is not in scope of this impact assessment.

Section B: Policy objectives and intended effects

12. As described above, despite current requirements to provide accurate information, providers still face incentives to provide false or misleading information. Therefore a stronger deterrent and mechanism to hold non-compliant providers to account is required.

13. The policy objective is to deter providers from supplying false or misleading information to the public, regulators and commissioners and to hold those who do to account.

\(^{1}\) 2013, Francis R, Mid-Staffordshire Foundation Trust Public Inquiry, Chapter 22, Para 22.4-22.23

\(^{2}\) 2013, Francis R, Mid-Staffordshire Foundation Trust Public Inquiry, Recommendation 182
14. The intended effects are to improve transparency and identification of issues which allows corrective action to be taken as soon as possible. This could help prevent future incidents and improve quality of care through better provider internal control, better patient choice, and better commissioning and regulation. It would also mean providers could be held fully accountable for misleading the public, regulators and commissioners.

Section C: Description of the options

Option 1: False or misleading Information Criminal Sanction: Introduce a criminal offence for health and social care providers who supply false or misleading information, targeted through subsequent regulations on certain types of information - such as mortality rates and waiting times data - supplied by secondary care providers.

15. It will be ensured that there is clarity and not duplication between this provision and existing provisions in relation to Monitor.

16. This offence does not create any additional data or information requests. The offence will apply to existing information duties, and any future duties. Providers of secondary care would still be required to provide accurate information in compliance with statutory information requests as they are now. However, under this option the corporate body would face criminal prosecution if it provides false or misleading management and performance information.

17. Providers who make a genuine administrative error would not be prosecuted if they can evidence a defence that due diligence had been undertaken to avoid providing false or misleading information. Subject to the usual two-stage test before commencing a prosecution (that there is a sufficiency of evidence and prosecution is in the public interest), providers who intentionally or recklessly provided false or misleading information could face prosecution.

18. This offence will apply to the provider as a corporate body. Therefore a custodial sentence is not possible and the penalty will be a remedial order, a fine and/or a publication order. A remedial order will permit the Court to specify steps that must be taken by the provider to remedy the breach that led to the conviction. A publication order could require the convicted organisation to publicise that is has been convicted, specifying particulars of the offence, the amount of any fine imposed and the terms of any remedial order made. Breach of either a remedial order or a publicity order would result in a further offence and a further fine. These penalties are assumed to be sufficient deterrents to bring about changes in behaviour. It is assumed that this will incentivise the board of directors of a provider, which is responsible for the corporate body and ultimately sign off information returns, to ensure there is an culture of openness and honesty in the supply or publication of information and there is sufficient due diligence in place.

19. It is assumed that cases could be tried through both Magistrate’s and Crown Court. For prudence, in terms of costing, this impact assessment assumes all cases would be tried through the more costly Crown Court.

20. It is not possible to know how many providers would be subject to investigation and prosecutions under this new offence. However, the total number of providers who could possibly be in scope of this new offence is expected to be around 500\(^3\). This provides a maximum upper bound of potential investigations and prosecutions. It is expected that the vast majority of providers undertake due diligence and do not purposefully provide false or misleading information, and therefore would not be subject to investigation and prosecution. This offence is required as it is expected that some providers will be purposefully or recklessly providing inaccurate information. Although this is expected to be a small minority, the implications of even one provider doing it are severe enough (see Para 7 and 58) to warrant a new offence to bring about prosecutions.

21. The criminal offence will be a strict liability offence of providing false or misleading information with a due diligence defence. The mechanism for identifying a body that has committed this offence is likely to be through individual action highlighting an issue or issues being picked up in existing data.

---

\(^3\) Based on the number of providers who submit information to Hospital Episode Statistics. Providers of HES data are providers of care provided in England by NHS hospitals and for NHS hospital patients treated elsewhere.
validation processes already used in the system. Potentially there could be increased monitoring or checks although this is expected to minimal. Therefore identification of potential non-compliance is not expected to require significant additional resources. However, any potential non compliance identified may require significant investigation before a decision to prosecute is reached. It is not yet decided what this is likely to involve or which organisation this function would sit with. Some providers may initially be investigated but not prosecuted when due diligence is demonstrated. The policy objective is to target only those providers who are suspected of purposefully providing false or misleading information. Prosecutions would only be pursued where it is in the public interest to do so. The current mechanism of returning data to the provider for correction and resubmission will continue to be used to deal with administrative errors.

22. Given all of the above, it is expected that there would be fewer than 10 investigations and potential prosecutions each year. A reasonable range is expected to be around 0 and 25 (5% of providers potentially in scope).

23. Following a prosecution, it will be possible for providers to appeal. It is expected that only the cases where there is unlikely to be a due diligence defence would be tried at all. Therefore it is not expected that there will be a significant number of appeal cases.

Option 2: Do nothing

24. Under this option providers would still be required to comply with statutory information requests by providing accurate information. The Health and Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC) already has the power under the Health and Social Care Act 2012 to publish its assessment of the quality of information it collects from providers against agreed information standards. However, this is an assessment of the quality of information only (e.g. its completeness) and does not identify or investigate whether the information may have been falsified. If information collected by the HSCIC appears to be unusual or inaccurate, it is normally returned to the provider to be corrected and resubmitted.

25. There are existing offences that deal with the supply or publication of false or misleading information, or more specifically false statements and false representations, such as section 2 of the Fraud Act 2006, section 19 of the Theft Act 1968 and section 5 of the Perjury Act 1911. However, the Fraud Act and Theft Act provisions address a specific type of behaviour (i.e. making a gain or loss, and deceiving members or creditors, respectively) that is not relevant to this policy problem. In addition, all three provisions are fault-based offences (rather than strict liability). The new provision is to apply only to corporate bodies, not to individuals. The threshold required to prove the intent to provide false or misleading information, in the form of a “directing mind”, as required to prove a fault-based offence against a corporate body, would make it difficult to bring successful prosecutions in the instances considered here. As such, a fault-based offence would not provide a sufficient deterrent. Further, these Fraud Act and Perjury Act offences are applicable to both corporate bodies and individuals, whereas the Theft Act offence is applicable to individual officers only. In all three provisions, the penalties include imprisonment, which is not an appropriate penalty for a corporate body.

26. The Health and Social Care Act 2012 makes provision to extend aspects of the Competition Act 1998 and the Enterprise Act 2002. As a result, there is already statutory provision for a criminal offence of providing false or misleading information to Monitor, but only in relation to certain (e.g. Monitor’s “competition functions”), but not all, of Monitor’s functions. These provisions do not extend to other statutory obligations to provide information to other regulators, commissioners, the Secretary of State or HSCIC.

27. In summary, the current provisions for offences, the consequences and mechanisms of accountability are an insufficient deterrent and/or insufficient in scope to address the provider incentives outlined above. The identified incentives to provide false or misleading information if it highlighted potential service issues would remain.
Section D: Costs and benefits assessment of the options (including specific impacts)

28. As per standard practice, the marginal impacts of this Option 1, compared to the baseline of do-nothing (Option 2), are considered below.

Costs

Investigating and prosecuting bodies

29. The police are likely to be responsible for charging providers. They will require assistance from another body, probably in the health and social care system to investigate potential breaches of the law and build a case. This information would then be passed to the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) for it to assess and commence prosecution proceedings, if it is in the public interest to do so.

30. The mechanism for identifying a body who has committed this offence is likely to be through individual action highlighting an issue or issues being picked up in existing data validation processes already used in the system. Potentially there could be increased monitoring or checks although this is expected to minimal. Therefore identification of potential non-compliance is not expected to require significant additional resources. However, any potential non compliance may require significant investigation. Therefore there may be costs to another organisation, and the police, of helping build the case and evaluating the evidence, to assist the CPS making a decision on whether to prosecute. It is not yet decided what this is likely to involve or which organisation this function would sit with. In addition it is not possible to know how much police time would be required. As such it is not possible to quantify these potential costs at this stage.

31. Following investigation, some providers may be prosecuted. As this is a new offence it is not possible to know how much time or resource a CPS prosecution would require. As a proxy, Ministry of Justice data suggests the average costs to the CPS per defendant in the Crown Court are £2560 (2011/12 prices). These are average costs based on a varied sample of offences and trials.

32. Based on the assumption that there will be fewer than 10 cases a year with a range of 0-25 the costs to the CPS may be between £0 and £64,000 with best estimate of around £26,000 per annum.

Justice System

33. There will be costs on the justice system of having a new offence under which prosecutions can be brought. It is assumed the penalties of being found guilty of the offence will be a remedial order, a fine and/or a publication order. It is assumed that cases could be tried through both Magistrate’s and Crown Court. For prudence, in terms of costing, this impact assessment assumes all cases would be tried through the more costly Crown Court.

34. It is not possible to know how much court time would be required, as it will vary case by case. As this is a new offence there is no historical data on which to form an assumption. A proxy may be cases of fraud and dishonesty, although this is a wide ranging category and will cover many cases that differ to those expected under this new offence. Ministry of Justice (MOJ) data suggests the cost to HM Courts and Tribunals Service per case of a fraud and forgery type offence in the Crown Court is around £3000 (in 2011/12 prices).

35. Based on the assumption that there will be fewer than 10 cases a year with a range of 0-25 the costs to the justice system may be between £0 and £75,000 with best estimate of around £30,000.

36. As the offence will apply to the corporate body, it is assumed that legal aid will not be applicable. Further as a custodial sentence is not possible and the penalty will be a fine, a remedial order and/or a publication order, there will be no costs associated with prison, probation or community sentencing.

37. It is has not yet being decided what the level of the potential fine will be. However, as a fine is a transfer payment it is not considered as an economic cost. Remedial orders and publication orders will need to be enforced, and breach of them could result in additional costs to the justice system.
Providers of NHS funded secondary care

Ensuring due diligence in supply or publication of information

38. It is assumed that the new offence will incentivise the Board of a provider, which is responsible for the corporate body and ultimately sign off information returns, to ensure there is an culture of openness and honesty in the supply or publication of information and there is sufficient due diligence in place. For the minority of providers that purposefully or recklessly supply false or misleading information this will require the organisation to invest time and resources to change its behaviour. It will need to ensure due diligence in their information gathering, reporting and validation systems. Any costs associated with this are necessary costs that the providers should already be incurring, when complying with statutory duties to provide information. This offence does not create any additional data or information requests. The offence will apply to existing information duties, and any future duties.

39. As discussed above it is expected that most providers of NHS funded care will already be providing accurate and robust information and be exercising sufficient due diligence. However, despite this, the new offence may still lead to costs for these providers as they go above and beyond what is necessary for fear of prosecution. As a result they may invest time and resources unnecessarily to improve their information gathering, reporting and validation. This is a risk (see Para 52 below).

40. It is not possible to know how provider behaviour will change in response to the new offence, nor how much additional resource providers will commit to submitting information returns and due diligence. In addition, how many and which information returns will be subject to this new offence is not yet known. It will cover management and performance information from NHS funded secondary care providers. This may include only central data returns and/or other information requests from regulators and commissioners. The scope of the new offence will be set out in subsequent regulations. However, for illustrative purposes, Review of Central Returns data suggests the current burden on providers of submitting mandatory central returns is around £32m\(^4\) per annum. If the new offence leads providers, on aggregate, spending 5% more time on existing central returns then the cost could be around £1.6m per annum. As mentioned above it is not possible to know if this is an under or over-estimate, it is included here for illustrative purposes only. Most of the providers incurring these costs will be NHS bodies.

Cost of investigation and mounting a defence

41. The mechanism for identifying a body who has committed this offence is likely to be through individual action highlighting an issue or issues being picked up in existing data validation processes already used in the system. Potentially there could be increased monitoring or checks by the responsible organisation. Any impact on providers is expected to be minimal. Therefore identification of potential non-compliance is not expected to be a significant additional burden to providers. However, any potential non compliance identified may require significant investigation before a decision to prosecute is reached. These costs would mainly fall on the investigating organisation (discussed above). However, some providers may face costs associated with initial investigation such as staff time and providing proof of due diligence. This should be limited as the policy objective is to target only those providers who are suspected of purposefully providing false or misleading information. It is not possible to know what this would involve and in most cases it expected to be dealt with through existing validation processes.

42. Where there is sufficient evidence, and it is in the public interest, some providers will be charged and taken to court. As a result they will need to mount a legal defence. Defence against the proposed offence is likely to be outside of the NHS Litigation Authority process as the cases will likely relate to deliberate or reckless acts by the corporate body. It is not possible to know what the defence costs under the new offence will be. As a proxy it is assumed that the defence will be at least as costly as the prosecution. From above the average costs to the CPS per defendant in the Crown Court are £2560 (2011/12 prices), this cost is used as the assumption for provider legal costs.

---

\(^4\) Uses ROCR estimates of staff time costs and DH estimates of employer national insurance costs and overheads. All mandatory or statutory central returns to HSCIC are included. This will include some non-secondary care returns and will exclude information returned directly to other bodies. ROCR data source: [http://www.ic.nhs.uk/rocr](http://www.ic.nhs.uk/rocr) data from February 2013.
43. Based on the assumption that there will be fewer than 10 cases a year with a range of 0-25 the total costs to all providers may be between £0 and £64,000 with best estimate of around £26,000 per annum.

44. In addition to the legal costs above a provider fighting a legal battle is likely to face some costs of distraction from its core business. Directors and senior management will be involved in the defence and time will be taken from their day to day responsibilities. Other staff are likely to be aware of the legal case and it could impact morale and productivity. It is not possible to quantify this potential impact.

**Costs of penalties**

45. Where a provider is found guilty of the offence the penalty will be a fine, a remedial order and/or a publication order.

46. It is has not yet being decided what the level of the fine will be. However, as a fine is a transfer payment it is not considered as an economic cost.

47. A remedial order set out steps that must be taken by the provider to remedy the breach that led to the conviction. Any changes required by the provider may have resource implications; these will vary case by case and it is not possible to quantify the impact. However, these will be actions it should already be taking to provide accurate information in compliance with existing (and any future) information requests.

48. A publicity order could require the convicted organisation to publicise that it has been convicted, specifying particulars of the offence, the amount of any fine imposed and the terms of any remedial order made. There may be some administrative costs but these are expected to be negligible. The main cost of this penalty will be the negative publicity which may have an impact on future business and operations. It is not possible to estimate the extent of this potential impact.

49. Breach of either a remedial order or a publicity order would result in a further offence and thus further defence costs and a further fine.

**Costs - summary**

50. The costs above are summarised in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring and investigation costs: Organisation TBC</td>
<td>UNQUANTIFIED</td>
<td>UNQUANTIFIED</td>
<td>UNQUANTIFIED</td>
<td>UNQUANTIFIED</td>
<td>UNQUANTIFIED</td>
<td>UNQUANTIFIED</td>
<td>UNQUANTIFIED</td>
<td>UNQUANTIFIED</td>
<td>UNQUANTIFIED</td>
<td>UNQUANTIFIED</td>
<td>UNQUANTIFIED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosecution costs: CPS</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Court time: HMCTS</td>
<td>£30,000</td>
<td>£30,000</td>
<td>£30,000</td>
<td>£30,000</td>
<td>£30,000</td>
<td>£30,000</td>
<td>£30,000</td>
<td>£30,000</td>
<td>£30,000</td>
<td>£30,000</td>
<td>£30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence costs: Providers</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distraction costs: Providers</td>
<td>UNQUANTIFIED</td>
<td>UNQUANTIFIED</td>
<td>UNQUANTIFIED</td>
<td>UNQUANTIFIED</td>
<td>UNQUANTIFIED</td>
<td>UNQUANTIFIED</td>
<td>UNQUANTIFIED</td>
<td>UNQUANTIFIED</td>
<td>UNQUANTIFIED</td>
<td>UNQUANTIFIED</td>
<td>UNQUANTIFIED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensuring information is not false or misleading: Providers</td>
<td>UNQUANTIFIED</td>
<td>UNQUANTIFIED</td>
<td>UNQUANTIFIED</td>
<td>UNQUANTIFIED</td>
<td>UNQUANTIFIED</td>
<td>UNQUANTIFIED</td>
<td>UNQUANTIFIED</td>
<td>UNQUANTIFIED</td>
<td>UNQUANTIFIED</td>
<td>UNQUANTIFIED</td>
<td>UNQUANTIFIED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penalties: Providers</td>
<td>UNQUANTIFIED</td>
<td>UNQUANTIFIED</td>
<td>UNQUANTIFIED</td>
<td>UNQUANTIFIED</td>
<td>UNQUANTIFIED</td>
<td>UNQUANTIFIED</td>
<td>UNQUANTIFIED</td>
<td>UNQUANTIFIED</td>
<td>UNQUANTIFIED</td>
<td>UNQUANTIFIED</td>
<td>UNQUANTIFIED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Cost (undiscounted)</td>
<td>£82,000</td>
<td>£82,000</td>
<td>£82,000</td>
<td>£82,000</td>
<td>£82,000</td>
<td>£82,000</td>
<td>£82,000</td>
<td>£82,000</td>
<td>£82,000</td>
<td>£82,000</td>
<td>£82,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discount adjustment</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Present Cost (discounted)</td>
<td>£62,000</td>
<td>£79,227</td>
<td>£76,548</td>
<td>£73,895</td>
<td>£71,458</td>
<td>£69,042</td>
<td>£66,707</td>
<td>£64,451</td>
<td>£62,272</td>
<td>£60,166</td>
<td>£705,830</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Risks**

**Perverse incentives**

51. Making it an offence to provide inaccurate information not only deters providers from providing inaccurate information but it may also deter them from providing information at all. This potential effect should be limited as the information requirements on providers in scope of the offence are duties in law and not discretionary. However, there may be a “bare minimum” interpretation of these duties.

52. In addition, where providers do provide information, because they risk criminal sanctions if it is inaccurate and they have not exercised due diligence, they may take much more time in providing it (this is considered under costs above – Para 39). They may also provide numerous caveats that make it difficult to understand and interpret the information and data. This risk could be mitigated through provision of advice on the interpretation of false or misleading information and due diligence; this is being considered.
53. Therefore, although the quality of information should increase, the quantity and clarity of it may reduce, and this would have a negative impact on overall transparency in the sector. As such, the benefits below may not be realised as expected.

Benefits

54. The proposed policy will allow legal action where a provider of NHS funded secondary care has provided false or misleading information and does not have sufficient due diligence in place. A provider risks a fine, a remedial order and/or a publication order if they commit this offence. These penalties are expected to deter providers from providing false or misleading data and information. It is assumed that this will incentivise the board of directors of a provider, which is responsible for the corporate body and ultimately sign off information returns, to ensure there is an culture of openness and honesty in the supply or publication of information and there is sufficient due diligence in place. As a result of this policy those providers that may have otherwise provided false or misleading information will be less likely to do so. Consequently, the information available to the public, service users, commissioners and regulators should be of a higher quality, and thus makes health care provision more transparent.

55. In addition, the new offence will also allow providers of NHS care to be held to account if they have mislead the public and the system.

56. It is not possible to quantify the deterrent effect and its beneficial impacts nor the benefits of increased accountability. The qualitative basis of them is set out below.

Service users and public

57. There is currently imperfect information in the health care market with providers having access to more information on their service quality than their service users, commissioner and regulators. The public, commissioners and regulators rely on providers of NHS care to provide/share this information and ensure it’s accurate. Data and information forms a vital basis of commissioning decisions, regulatory assessments or quality of safety and providers own monitoring and controls. False or misleading can enable poor and dangerous care to manifest and prevent regulatory or other corrective interventions to address the poor care. It can also prevent lessons being learnt and disseminated across the system.

58. For example, the Francis Inquiry found that the Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust made inaccurate statements about their mortality rates. Inaccurate statements about mortality rates delayed any investigation and thus identification of service issues. As a result corrective action was delayed and poor quality care was allowed to continue unchecked. It is estimated that hundreds of people received appalling care and/or may have died prematurely or unnecessarily at Mid Staffordshire hospital. For illustrative purposes if the loss of two years of full health could have been avoided for 400 people the social value of this benefit would be £48m.

59. There were a number of factors involved but supply or publication of inaccurate information by the Trust was a key component in enabling this to occur.

60. Increasing transparency, by improving the accuracy of information providers use and share could improve the quality of care for service users through:

- Better provider internal monitoring and control;
- Patient choice;
- Better commissioning; and

---

5 2013, Francis R, Mid-Staffordshire Foundation Trust Public Inquiry, Chapter 22, Para 22.4-22.23
7 Lower bound estimate of potential unexpected deaths at Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust based on Healthcare Commission Report 2009
8 Based on a societal willingness to pay £60,000 per Quality Adjusted Life Year (QALY) and a potential loss of 2 QALYs per person avoided. In order not to undervalue the life of different groups, where policies increase life expectancy, each year corresponds to a full QALY, irrespective of the quality of health, age or gender of the patient.
**Better regulation:**

**Better provider internal monitoring and control**

61. Provider boards and senior management will have access to, and consider, the information shared with other parties. The more accurate this information is, and the better the systems of gathering and reporting are, the better the understanding the organisation has of its own performance and any issues. This should enable early identification of issues and responsive corrective action by the provider. As a result, quality of care may improve and access may be protected.

**Patient choice**

62. More accurate information improves the ability of service users and the public to understand the quality of health services. This enables them to make better informed choices about which providers to use and where to receive care. This empowers patients and incentivises providers to compete on quality. As a result, quality of care may improve.

**Better commissioning**

63. More accurate information improves the ability of commissioners to understand the quality of the services they are purchasing on behalf of their patient population. This enables them to make better decisions about which providers to contract for care. Improved information also improves their ability to hold providers to account and vary their contracts accordingly, which incentivises providers to provide quality services. As a result, quality of care may improve and access protected.

**Better regulation**

64. More accurate information allows earlier identification of potential issues with quality of care. This enables the regulators to trigger correction action sooner. This prevents problems persisting. As a result, quality of care may improve and access may be protected.

**Public confidence**

65. As well as improving quality of care and safeguarding access for service users, general public confidence in the health care system and the use of tax payer funds should be increased through the greater transparency brought about by more accurate information and increase accountability of provider of NHS funded care.

**Commissioners and regulators**

66. Where commissioners and regulators have access to more reliable and accurate information they may need to invest fewer resources in investigating providers. These may free up resources which can enable more to be spent on improving poor care rather than identifying it, and/or efficiency savings.

**Value for Money**

67. The below table shows the profile of the net present value of identified impacts over a 10 year period. All figures are based on assumptions and should be treated as such, however this represent our best understanding of the likely impacts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring and investigation costs: Organisation TBC</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>UNQUANTIFIED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosecution costs: CPS</td>
<td>£30,000</td>
<td>£30,000</td>
<td>£30,000</td>
<td>£30,000</td>
<td>£30,000</td>
<td>£30,000</td>
<td>£30,000</td>
<td>£30,000</td>
<td>£30,000</td>
<td>£30,000</td>
<td>£30,000</td>
<td>£300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Court time: HMCTS</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£260,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence costs: Providers</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£260,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distraction costs: Providers</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
<td>£260,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensuring information is not false or misleading: Providers</td>
<td>UNQUANTIFIED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penalties: Providers</td>
<td>UNQUANTIFIED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total Cost (undiscounted) | £82,000 | £82,000 | £82,000 | £82,000 | £82,000 | £82,000 | £82,000 | £82,000 | £82,000 | £82,000 | £82,000 | £820,000 |
| Discount adjustment | 1.00 | 1.04 | 1.07 | 1.11 | 1.15 | 1.19 | 1.23 | 1.27 | 1.32 | 1.36 |
| Total Present Cost (discounted) | £82,000 | £79,227 | £76,548 | £73,959 | £71,458 | £69,042 | £66,707 | £64,451 | £62,272 | £60,166 | £5705,830 |
| Net Present Value | £82,000 | £79,227 | £76,548 | £73,959 | £71,458 | £69,042 | £66,707 | £64,451 | £62,272 | £60,166 | £705,830 |

68. The costs are based on proxies from other investigations and prosecutions. In addition, it is not known how many providers would be investigated and prosecuted under the proposed offence. As
such the quantified costs are estimates only. Given this they are sensitivity tested below under scenarios:

- If 5% of providers (25) were prosecuted each year, the legal cost estimate would be around £200k pa and the NPV over 10 years would be £1.8m.
- If the legal costs were double the above estimates, the legal cost estimated would be around £165k pa and the NPV over 10 years would be £1.4m.
- If 5% of providers were prosecuted AND the legal costs were double the above estimate the legal cost estimate would be around £410k pa and the NPV over 10 years would be £3.5m.
- If the loss of two years of full health could be avoided for 400 people the social value of this benefit would be £48m.  

The net present value is negative as it only includes the quantifiable identified costs. There will be additional costs which have not been possible to quantify at this stage. In addition, it has not been possible to quantify the benefits of this policy although it is known from the case study of Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust that supply or publication of misleading information did contribute to poor quality care and delayed corrective action. Therefore, as this policy deters behaviour that may give rise to a similar situation it is expected that the quality of care will improve compared to the counterfactual, and thus the benefits will be realised at least to some extent. It is impossible to know if another large ongoing failure in care would occur if this policy was not implemented. However, it is expected is that this policy will make it less likely. The social value of avoiding another situation like Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust, even if only considering the avoided health loss, is significant.

One-In-Two-Out

70. It has been agreed with the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) and the Reducing Regulation Committee (RRC) that this policy is out of scope of the One-in Two-out policy on new regulation.

71. The new offence will only apply to providers of health and social care, and will be limited in application by regulations to NHS funded secondary care and information provided. This offence does not create any additional data or information requests. The offence will apply to existing information statutory duties, and any future duties.

72. The new offence will be strict liability with a due diligence defence. The offence will not bite on those who have made a genuine mistake or administrative error in providing false or misleading information, provided they can demonstrate that they have exercised due diligence ie the provider had adequate procedures in place designed to prevent false or misleading information from being provided. Providers should already have due diligence procedures and arrangements in place, so the offence does not extend the regulatory scheme. Moreover, the offence is addressing criminal behaviour and should not be considered as regulatory. Those who have been reckless or wilful in providing false or misleading information will be a subset of those who fall within scope of the offence. BIS has confirmed “that if the duty to provide accurate information is breached only if a provider knowingly provides inaccurate or misleading information, it should not be regulatory”. Further, “where a firm knowingly acts in a way that breaches a law or seeks to deceive, that measures to strengthen that law should not be classed as regulatory”.

Section E: Equality Impact Assessment and summary of specific impact tests

Equality Impact Assessment

73. This policy proposal impacts providers of NHS funded secondary care. The costs will not impact service users or any group of individuals. The benefits of improved quality of care through better information exchange across the system will be realised by users of NHS health care. This policy will not disproportionately affect any one demographic or social group. In general, the NHS patient

---

9 Based on a societal willingness to pay £60,000 per Quality Adjusted Life Year (QALY) and a potential loss of 2 QALYs per person avoided.
population tends to be people from older age groups, lower income distribution and those with disabilities or long-term conditions.

**Competition**

74. In any affected market, would the proposal:
   - Directly limit the number or range of suppliers?
   75. No. The proposals do not involve the award of exclusive rights to supply services, procurement will not be from a single supplier or restricted group of suppliers.
   - Indirectly limit the number or range of suppliers?
   76. No, this regulation is not a significant barrier of exit or entry into the market.
   - Limit the ability of suppliers to compete?
   77. This duty will apply to providers of NHS funded secondary care. All providers who hold NHS contracts face the same requirement and risk of prosecution. This duty does not apply to independent health care services that do not provide NHS care.
   - Indirectly limit the number or range of suppliers?
   78. This duty does not limit the scope for innovation for the introduction of new products or supply existing products in new ways. It does not limit the sales channels a supplier can use, or the geographic area in which a supplier can operate. It does not limit the suppliers' freedoms to organise their own production processes or their choice of organisational form.
   - Limit the ability of suppliers to compete?
   79. It does not substantially restrict the ability of suppliers to advertise their products; however, NHS providers will have provide accurate information and this may impact there reputation and advertising of services.
   - Reduce suppliers' incentives to compete vigorously?
   80. The proposal does not exempt the suppliers from general competition law. It does require NHS providers to provide accurate information on services to interested parties which may include information in the public domain. This should increase competition.

**Small firms**

- How does the proposal affect small businesses, their customers or competitors?

81. The duty would apply to providers of NHS funded secondary care of all sizes and the impacts are as described above. Most providers will not be small firms. Further, it has been agreed with BIS that this policy is not regulatory and thus not in scope of One-in Two-out.

**Legal Aid/ Justice Impact**

82. The following have been considered in the main impact assessment above and in the Ministry of Justice impact test provided alongside this document:
   - Will the proposals create new civil sanctions, fixed penalties or civil orders with criminal sanctions or creating or amending criminal offences? **Yes**
   - Any impact on HM Courts services or on Tribunals services through the creation of or an increase in application cases? **Yes**
   - Create a new right of appeal or route top judicial review? Enforcement mechanisms for civil debts, civil sanctions or criminal penalties? **Yes**
   - Amendment of Court and/or tribunal rules? **No**
   - Amendment of sentencing or penalty guidelines? **No**
   - Any impact (increase or reduction on costs) on Legal Aid fund? (criminal, civil and family, asylum) **No**
   - Any increase in the number of offenders being committed to custody (including on remand) or probation? **No**
   - Any increase in the length of custodial sentences? Will proposals create a new custodial sentence? **No**
Any impact of the proposals on probation services? No

**Sustainable Development**

83. The proposals are not expected to have a wider impact on sustainable development. There will be no impact on climate change, waste management, air quality, landscape appearance, habitat, wildlife, levels of noise exposure or water pollution, abstraction or exposure to flood.

**Health Impact**

- Do the proposals have a significant effect on human health by virtue of their affect on certain determinants of health, or a significant demand on health service? (primary care, community services, hospital care, need for medicines, accident or emergency services, social services, health protection and preparedness response)

84. The potential impacts on health have been considered above in the cost benefit analysis of this impact assessment, see Section D above.

85. There are no expected health risks in association with, diet, lifestyle, tobacco and alcohol consumption, psycho-social environment, housing conditions, accidents and safety, pollution, exposure to chemicals, infection, geophysical and economic factors, as a result of the proposals

**Rural Proofing**

- Rural proofing is a commitment by Government to ensure domestic policies take account of rural circumstances and needs. It is a mandatory part of the policy process, which means as policies are developed, policy makers should: consider whether their policy is likely to have a different impact in rural areas because of particular circumstances or needs, make proper assessment of those impacts, if they’re likely to be significant, adjust the policy where appropriate, with solutions to meet rural needs and circumstances.

86. The proposals will not lead to potentially different impacts for rural areas or people.

**Wider impacts**

87. The main purpose of the proposed duty and offence is to deter providers of NHS funded care from providing inaccurate information to protect self rather than public interest.

**Economic impacts**

88. The costs and benefits of the proposals on businesses have been considered in the main cost benefit analysis of this impact assessments, see Section D above.

**Environmental impacts and sustainable development**

89. The proposals have not identified any wider effects on environmental issues including on carbon and greenhouse gas emissions.

**Social impacts**

90. No impact has been identified in relation to rural issues or the justice system.

**Section F: Summary and conclusion**

91. Based on the above impact assessment the preferred option is Option 1: False or misleading Information Criminal Sanction: Introduce a criminal offence for health and social care providers who supply false or misleading information, targeted through subsequent regulations on certain types of information - such as mortality rates and waiting times data - supplied by secondary care providers. It is not known how many investigations and prosecutions there would be under this new offence, but it is expected to be very low.

92. There is also uncertainty about the resources required to prosecute under this offence, however cost assumption have been developed in discussion with MOJ. Based on this it is expected that the legal costs to the HMCTS, CPS, and providers are between £0 and £203,000 with a best estimate of around £82,000 per annum (in 2011/12 prices). There will be additional costs to providers (from changing their behaviour) and to the organisation(s) that will assist CPS with investigating cases. Although there are risks that this offence creates perverse incentives it is expected that the
identified benefits or improved commissioning, regulation and quality of care will be realised. Although unquantified these benefits are expected to at least outweigh the identified costs.