



# Science and Technology Committee

House of Commons London SW1A 0AA  
<http://www.parliament.uk/science>  
[scitechcom@parliament.uk](mailto:scitechcom@parliament.uk)

From Rt Hon Norman Lamb MP, Chair

Ryan Ding  
Executive Director  
Huawei  
300 South Oak Way  
Green Park  
Reading  
Berkshire  
RG2 6UF

15 January 2019

Dear Ryan Ding,

## Security of the UK's communications infrastructure

I am writing to you in my capacity as Chair of the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee following recent concern regarding the security of the UK's telecommunications networks. I have also recently written to UK Government Ministers seeking assurances on this issue.

As you will know, many of the UK's 'Five Eyes' allies have recently acted to reduce the role that certain foreign telecommunications providers have in supplying components to their telecommunications network operators.<sup>1</sup> Some of these measures target your company explicitly.

I am aware that Huawei has invested in the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre (HCSEC) to address similar concerns in the UK. However, I note that the HCSEC Oversight Board's latest annual report concluded that "due to areas of concern exposed through the proper functioning of the mitigation strategy and associated oversight mechanisms, the Oversight Board can provide only limited assurance that all risks to UK national security from Huawei's involvement in the UK's critical networks have been sufficiently mitigated".<sup>2</sup>

Concerns have also been raised regarding the implications of Chinese legislation, such as the National Intelligence Law passed in 2017, and the requirement it might place on Chinese companies to assist in intelligence work.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See, for example: US Congress, '[John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019](#)' (2018); Australian Ministers for Communications and the Arts, '[Government Provides 5G Security Guidance To Australian Carriers](#)', 23 August 2018; New Zealand Government Communications Security Bureau, '[GCSB statement](#)', 28 November 2018

<sup>2</sup> Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre Oversight Board, '[Annual Report 2018](#)' (2018)

<sup>3</sup> Chinese National People's Congress, '[National Intelligence Law of the People's Republic](#)' (2017); Australian Strategic Policy Institute, '[Huawei and the ambiguity of China's intelligence and counter-espionage laws](#)', 13 September 2018

Given the obvious importance of the security of the UK's communications infrastructure, I would be grateful if you could answer the following questions:

- What reassurances can you give to demonstrate that your products and services pose no threat to UK national security?
- How do you respond to actions being taken over foreign involvement in communications networks by other nations, such as the UK's 'Five Eyes' allies?
- How do you intend to respond to the HCSEC Oversight Board's latest annual report?
- To what extent could Huawei be compelled to assist Chinese national intelligence work using its UK-based hardware or software, or information gathered in the UK?

I look forward to your response. I would be grateful if you could provide a response no later than Tuesday 29 January. I would expect that the Committee will wish to publish our exchange on our website given the public interest in this issue.

*Yours sincerely,*



**Rt Hon Norman Lamb MP**  
*Chair*