Summary: Intervention and Options

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost of Preferred (or more likely) Option</th>
<th>RPC Opinion: AMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Net Present Value</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£0m</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Business Net Present Value</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£0m</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Net cost to business per year (EANCB on 2009 prices)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£0m</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>In scope of One-In, One-Out?</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Measure qualifies as</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What is the problem under consideration? Why is government intervention necessary?
The term of copyright protection for an artistic work is life of the creator plus 70 years. However, UK copyright legislation contains an exception (section 52 of the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988) which effectively limits the term to 25 years if the artistic work is mass produced. A company which makes 'furniture design classics' has claimed that it loses more than EUR 250 million per year in international turnover due to copies and that a significant proportion of that loss is attributable to the UK legislation which differs from that in other EU states.

What are the policy objectives and the intended effects?
The Government wants to repeal section 52. This will mean that copyright applies for life of the creator plus 70 years rather than 25 years to artistic works which are manufactured on the industrial scale. It will update and clarify UK law and bring it in to line with EU law.

What policy options have been considered, including any alternatives to regulation? Please justify preferred option (further details in Evidence Base)
- Option 1 - Do nothing.
- Option 2 - Repeal section 52 of the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988.

Option 2 is the preferred option as it will update and clarify UK legislation in line with EU law.

Will the policy be reviewed? It will be reviewed. If applicable, set review date: 05/2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Does implementation go beyond minimum EU requirements?</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Are any of these organisations in scope? If Micros not exempted set out reason in Evidence Base.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micro Yes</td>
<td>&lt; 20 Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traded:</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I have read the Impact Assessment and I am satisfied that (a) it represents a fair and reasonable view of the expected costs, benefits and impact of the policy, and (b) that the benefits justify the costs.

Signed by the responsible SELECT SIGNATORY: [Signature] Date: 15/5/2012
## Summary: Analysis & Evidence

**Policy Option 1**

**Description:** Do nothing

### FULL ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Price Base Year</th>
<th>PV Base Year</th>
<th>Time Period Years</th>
<th>Net Benefit (Present Value (PV)) (£m)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Low: Optional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COSTS (£m)</strong></td>
<td>Total Transition (Constant Price)</td>
<td>Average Annual (excl. Transition) (Constant Price)</td>
<td>Total Cost (Present Value)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best Estimate</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Description and scale of key monetised costs by 'main affected groups'**

No change

**Other key non-monetised costs by 'main affected groups'**

No change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>BENEFITS (£m)</strong></th>
<th>Total Transition (Constant Price)</th>
<th>Average Annual (excl. Transition) (Constant Price)</th>
<th>Total Benefit (Present Value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best Estimate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Description and scale of key monetised benefits by 'main affected groups'**

No change

**Other key non-monetised benefits by 'main affected groups'**

No change

### Key assumptions/sensitivities/risks

Discount rate (%) 3.5

### BUSINESS ASSESSMENT (Option 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direct impact on business (Equivalent Annual) £m:</th>
<th>In scope of OIOO?</th>
<th>Measure qualifies as</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Costs: 0</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefits: 0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net: 0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2
**Summary: Analysis & Evidence**

**Description:** Repeal section 52 of the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988

**FULL ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Price Base Year 2012</th>
<th>PV Base Year 2012</th>
<th>Time Period Years</th>
<th>Net Benefit (Present Value (PV)) (£m)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Low: 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High: 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Best Estimate: 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COSTS (£m)</th>
<th>Total Transition (Constant Price)</th>
<th>Average Annual (excl. Transition) (Constant Price)</th>
<th>Total Cost (Present Value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best Estimate</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Description and scale of key monetised costs by ‘main affected groups’
We do not have adequate data to make reasoned estimates of monetised costs.

**Other key non-monetised costs by ‘main affected groups’**
Firms who manufacture/sell replicas which will become illegal will be vulnerable to civil action from firms who hold original copyrights. They’ll have to invest in substitutes or purchase licences. Consumers won’t have access to certain cheap copies of classic designs and will need to buy other substitute products. Costs will be borne by Government only to the extent that there is resort to the criminal process and that costs are not recovered from defendants or offset by proceeds of crime recoveries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BENEFITS (£m)</th>
<th>Total Transition (Constant Price)</th>
<th>Average Annual (excl. Transition) (Constant Price)</th>
<th>Total Benefit (Present Value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best Estimate</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Description and scale of key monetised benefits by ‘main affected groups’
We do not have adequate data to make reasoned estimates of monetised benefits.

**Other key non-monetised benefits by ‘main affected groups’**
Manufacturers and distributors of some design classics will be able to stop the manufacture, distribution and sale of replicas. It is unlikely that in some sectors (e.g. classic design furniture), the illegal replicas are substitutes for the originals because of the large price differential. However, firms argue that they will be able to reinvest any increased profits in the promotion of innovative designs and artistic works. Further investment in innovation will contribute to economic growth.

**Key assumptions/sensitivities/risks**
Discount rate (%) 3.5

We assume increased profits to original designers will be invested in innovation.

**BUSINESS ASSESSMENT (Option 2)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direct Impact on business (Equivalent Annual) (£m):</th>
<th>In scope of OIOO?</th>
<th>Measure qualifies as</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Costs: 0</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefits: 0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net: 0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Evidence Base (for summary sheets)

1. Background

The Government intends to repeal section 52 of the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 ('section 52') in the Enterprise and Regulation Bill. No consultation has been carried out as this is being done in order to update and clarify UK legislation and bring it in line with EU law.

Section 52 effectively limits copyright in certain artistic works, copies of which are industrially manufactured (i.e. more than 50 copies are made), to a period of 25 years from the end of the year in which the copies were first marketed. However, the term of copyright protection for an artistic work is life of the creator plus 70 years.

The overall purpose of this provision is to stop copyright being used to prevent the copying of designs and to reduce double protection. It does so by aligning the period of copyright protection for an artistic work which is mass produced with the period that it would have enjoyed as just a registered design. The 25 year period is based on the current maximum term of registered design protection and the provision acts as a sort of boundary line between the copyright and design regimes.

A similar provision existed in the Copyright Act 1956 which was replaced by the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988.

Example: a painter creates a painting. He later authorises teapots to be made with a reproduction of his painting on the side. After 25 years, the painter can no longer prevent his painting being copied onto competing teapots or any other kind of article.

Note that certain items are excluded from the exception in section 52 and therefore enjoy the unrestricted copyright term (e.g. works of sculpture, book jackets, calendars, greeting cards) and the exception does not extend to films. So the painter in the example above could prevent his painting being reproduced in a film.

2. Problem under consideration

The effect of section 52 is, as stated above, to limit the exclusive rights of a copyright owner of an artistic work to 25 years where that work has been applied industrially.

A judgment of the European Court of Justice of 27 January 2011 (Flos SpA v Semeraro Casa e Famiglia SpA, Case C-168/09, (the Flos case)) dealt with the importation from China and distribution in Italy of lamps which infringed the copyright in the well known Arco lamp which belongs to Flos. Following that judgment, a company that makes classic design furniture has approached the Government. It has claimed that its worldwide losses on account of copies are more than EUR250 million per year in turnover. It also claims that a significant proportion of that loss arises directly from the UK’s restrictions on copyright protection for its classic designs.

Moreover, a number of other manufacturers of classic design furniture (which include Flos, Vitra, Cassina, Fritz Hansen, Teknoloumen, Classicon, Knoll and Thonet who are all based outside the UK) are campaigning for the law to be changed. They claim that the effect of section 52 is to prevent them from taking infringement action against parties importing and selling replica furniture.

The Government has been told that nearly all the significant internet importers into the EU from the Far East of the replicas use the UK as a staging post to take advantage of the UK’s relaxed copyright legislation and have pointed out that the only other Member States which reduce the term of protection afforded by copyright to designs are Estonia and Romania.
The extensive use made by the internet importers of the UK as a staging post for EU wide sales, means that it is likely that a very significant part of this claimed loss could be caused by infringers trading in the UK.

It is, however, worth bearing in mind that the number of products manufactured and sold in the UK which may be affected by the repeal of section 52 is uncertain for the following reasons:

i) it is unclear what proportion of items which are sold and/ or industrially manufactured in the UK copy or incorporate an artistic work protected by copyright; and

ii) the number of works which would meet the requisite standards to qualify for copyright protection cannot be estimated without wide margins of error.

It is worth expanding upon (ii) and the unquantifiable number of items may qualify for copyright protection. Broadly this boils down to the fact that in principle, it is for each Member State to determine the extent to which and the conditions under which copyright protection apply. In the UK, if an item is essentially functional (and the work's artistic expression is constrained by functional considerations), it is unlikely to qualify for copyright protection and this means that potentially very few household products and pieces of furniture are likely to qualify for copyright protection. This, in turn means that the impact of repealing section 52 may have limited impact in some sectors.

However, the landscape is changing with the advent of a number of recent judgments from the European Court of Justice which have had the effect of harmonising the conditions under which copyright protection apply. These developments may mean that more items will potentially qualify for copyright protection and, accordingly, the impact of repealing section 52 would be more significant.

3. Rationale for intervention.

The rationale for UK intervention is to clarify and update UK legislation and ensure that it is in line with EU law.

4. Policy objective

The policy objective for UK intervention is to clarify and update UK legislation and ensure that it is in line with EU law. This will also respond to requests from designers and design firms to bring protection for their work closer to standards in other EU Member States.

5. Description of options considered (including do nothing)

Option 1: do nothing

This means leaving section 52 in the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988. It also means that parties will remain unable to bring copyright infringement proceedings to protect certain copyright works.

Option 2: Repeal s.52

Repealing section 52 will mean that copyright applies for life of the creator plus 70 rather than 25 years to artistic works which are manufactured on the industrial scale. This potentially applies to some classic furniture designs, and possibly other products such as jewellery and common household items, which qualify for copyright protection.
The manufacturers and distributors of design classics will be able to bring legal proceedings to stop the manufacture, distribution and sale of those replicas which will become illegal. They cannot do this at present in the UK.

6. Costs and benefits of options (including administrative burden)

Proportionality

Pressure on Government to change the law

This change to primary legislation is driven by calls for the Government to clarify and update UK law in line with EU law. The impact assessment has therefore been made taking a proportionate approach, recognising the pressure upon the Government to update and clarify the law. Therefore, it would be disproportionate to conduct a detailed analysis of the monetised costs and benefits.

The assessment identifies the areas in which costs and benefits will arise, but in a number of areas it is not possible without very detailed analysis to make precise assessments of value in what are complex and heterogeneous industries. Industry sources with which we have discussed the changes have not been able to provide adequate bases for estimates.

Significance of furniture

The policy issue concerns the cumulative protection of the regimes for copyright and design rights. There is no registration of copyright but designs can be registered. Looking at the number of registered designs, furniture is the sector which attracts the largest number of registered rights, it follows that since there may also be copyright in some of those designs, this is the sector which is potentially most affected by section 52.

The table below shows the total number of rights applied for at the EU Design Right Office by rights class over the period 2003-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Furniture</th>
<th>Household goods</th>
<th>Containers</th>
<th>Jewellery etc</th>
<th>Lighting</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>60,035</td>
<td>30,388</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>19,299</td>
<td>22,211</td>
<td>132,132</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source IPO Analysis of OHIM registration data

This distribution of rights applied for is representative of the pattern of demand by consumers, and of distribution, rather than of manufacturing supply. This is because a high proportion of furniture demand in the UK, and a significant part of other product categories including 'designed products' are met by imports. UK designers account for over 6% of the registrations in furniture and household products above, but less than 4% of registrations in jewellery and lighting.

The pattern is consistent with the fact that, so far, the IPO is only aware of calls from the manufacturers of classic design furniture to change the law. It is also consistent with data on distribution of industry activity of subscribers to the design protection membership organisation Anti Copying in Design (ACID) http://www.acid.eu.com/news/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/ACID-Quarterly-Newsletter-Issue-40.pdf which exists to help designers create and retain value from their work. Furniture designers are its largest single industry group, with significant numbers also in jewellery, lighting and ceramics.

With this consistent picture, most of the evidence examined in this assessment relates to furniture, but some attention is given to other markets. Given the pressure to change the law, and the difficulty of gathering detailed data in these fragmented and highly differentiated sectors, this is a proportionate approach.
Office for National Statistics data from the 2009 Prodcom survey shows that furniture is much the largest area of economic activity in this area. It shows that in most areas covered by these products there is a large (and growing) negative balance of trade.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>UK Sales</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Office / shop furniture</td>
<td>1284</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitchen furniture</td>
<td>1093</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other furniture</td>
<td>3192</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>2115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal jewellery (where precious metal is main component)</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>2183*</td>
<td>1826*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pottery tableware</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source ONS Prodcom survey 2009

* affected by trading of precious materials


The Prodcom survey also records, for some products, volume or weight as well as value. This is helpful in understanding relative prices for domestically produced and imported products. In all the above areas where this comparison can be made (for jewellery the data is not available) average UK sales prices are an order of magnitude higher than prices of imports, especially of imports from outside the EU.

Volume and value of imports

The ratios of average domestic to imported prices range from as high as 20:1 in some areas of furniture to 3:1 in tableware. This tends to confirm, as shown later, that most imported products compete in very different, lower priced, segments of their markets compared to domestically produced goods. It also means that volume shares of imports in the 'non premium' parts of these markets are very much higher than the value figures imply. This has a significant bearing on considerations of the impact of the policy measure.

For 'personal jewellery' (where precious metal is the main component, see table above), reported trade is much larger than UK production. Watches, some of which are thought of as jewellery, have few UK producers. Watches are not included within the official statistics for jewellery but are often sold and distributed through the same channels. They show similar trade patterns to jewellery, and similar pricing patterns to furniture, with high volumes of low priced imports. However on closer examination of categories such as luxury jewellery and watches, it seems that there is likely to be very little impact from the proposed change. It would ultimately be the Courts to decide whether any particular product met the threshold for copyright protection. In any event, the proposed change in the law is unlikely to have significant effects on trade; notwithstanding that UK production of watches is very low. This is because most watches are protected by branded and protected by a trade mark and this is likely to continue to be the most effective way of preventing unauthorised replicas.

Option 1 – No Change

Costs to Business
There will be no change to the ability of firms to import copies of classic designs which also qualify for copyright.

UK producers engaged in copying classic designs which also qualify for copyright, will be able to continue to operate in a manner unchanged.

Costs to Consumers
Consumers will see no change

Costs to Government
The potential costs to Government are those which might arise from proceedings aimed at seeking clarification of the current law and its relationship with EU law.

**Benefits**
There will be no benefit by way of relief to firms whose works are protected by copyright but who cannot enforce their rights after 25 years from when they were first marketed if they are mass produced.

**Option 2 – Repeal section 52 of the CDPA**

**Costs**

**Costs to business**

The Government proposes to consult when the repeal should come into effect. This is the most proportionate approach for clarifying the range of products which may potentially be affected and how long business will need to make any necessary changes.

**UK importers**
The ability of firms to import copies of classic designs which also qualify for copyright protection and sell them through UK distributors will be curtailed unless the term of copyright protection has expired. This means that the range of importers (identified to Government by manufacturers) will no longer be able to use artistic designs which may be protected by copyright. Most of these importers are international firms, which use the UK as a point of entry to the EU because of the loophole in UK law. It is likely that a significant part of the profits and employment of these firms is outside the UK, even if they have registered subsidiaries in the UK. To remain in business, these firms will need to switch to: products which use their own designs or designs which do not also qualify for copyright protection; or other designs for which they have obtained a licence.

**UK producers**
Producers engaged in copying designs which were first marketed over 25 years ago but which are still covered by copyright will no longer be able to do so. However, analysis of company reports associated with sales websites suggests that copying production – certainly in the furniture industry which is the largest area where it is common – is often from international companies, and sourced from China and the Far East. Evidence to this effect has been presented to IPO by firms in the industry, in the ELLE Decoration ‘Equal Rights for Design’ (April 2012) campaign, and by ACID. The recent increase in low price imports from the Far East also shows in the official trade statistics.

If the main impact of the measure is on low priced imports, the impact on UK manufacturing is likely to be small. Where firms are able to switch to alternative designs, which do not qualify for copyright protection or where the copyright has expired, they will be able to continue in operation and remain in the market.

Producers will also be able to seek licences from copyright owners to use classic designs, in which case they will need to negotiate a royalty agreement acceptable to both sides. There are no administrative registration costs associated with copyright (unlike registered designs) but there may be legal costs to set up a licensing agreement. It is not possible to estimate the impact on potential licensing costs, the number of agreements or legal costs because these will depend on demand for classic products compared with demand for products of more recent design.

It is possible that some producers will continue to copy, without licences, and face legal action by the copyright holders that they cannot undertake with the law as it is today. In principle costs of legal action incurred by those who break the law should not be counted in an impact assessment, but it is at least possible that some unjustified actions might be brought. This may give rise to legal costs which cannot be quantified.

**UK retailers**
Retailers engaged in selling copied designs which will qualify for copyright and which are not covered by a licence will need to change their mix of products to substitute either products for which a licence is available, to new designs rather than copies of old ones, or to products which do not qualify for copyright protection. There may be transition costs as stocks are changed, although rotation of styles is standard in the industry. The Government’s intention is to provide a commencement date long enough to enable retailers to dispose of existing stock of copied models and to switch to other products. The Government proposes to consult on this date.

Cost to consumers

Consumers will no longer be able to buy cheap copies of some classic designs, which may result in loss of choice and welfare. However, it is clear from the very large differences in price between original products and imported copies that few if any will switch to buy at higher prices from the design/copyright owners. Across a range of furniture and lighting products, the copies typically sell at around 15% of the price of originals. Differences for jewellery are even more extreme.

### Prices of originals and copies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designed Products</th>
<th>Original Producer price £</th>
<th>Online Replica price £</th>
<th>Replica Price as % of Original</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fritz Hansen Egg Chair</td>
<td>2,799</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flos Arco Silver Floor light</td>
<td>1,615</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eileen Gray side table</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Eames Lounge chair</td>
<td>5,065</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ludwig Mies van der Rohe</td>
<td>2,412</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barcelona chair</td>
<td>3,877</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshmallow Sofa</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLOSSOM Suspension Light</td>
<td>3,457</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coconut Chair</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>35.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nelsons table</td>
<td>206.40</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IPO research on company websites May 2012

The process of defining a market in a competition investigation (set out in OFT guidelines) typically begins by establishing the closest substitutes to the product or group of products that is the focus of the investigation. These substitute products are the most immediate competitive constraints on the behaviour of the undertaking supplying the product in question. In order to establish which products are ‘close enough’ substitutes to be in the relevant market, a conceptual framework known as the hypothetical monopolist test (the test) is usually employed. In these markets the price differentials between the 2 sets of products are way outside the indicative 5-10% price increases that would be looked at. Therefore it would be reasonable to suggest that the original and imitation designs are in separate markets and do not compete directly.

One possible cost which should be taken into account is that the introduction of copyright to this market may lead to some works with designs over 25 but less the term of copyright protection (life of the creator plus 70 years) disappearing from the market altogether, because of the complexities and costs of copyright. This would reduce consumer choice without any compensating benefit. New work by Paul Heald (University of Illinois March 2012, http://www.techdirt.com/blog?tag=paul+heald) shows how this has occurred in book publishing. It is not possible to judge in advance how far this might affect designs, but the policy review will pay attention to this potential issue, and if it is found to be a problem, how to address it.

Costs to Government
Key costs to Government will be those associated with pursuing (in criminal proceedings) infringing firms, which copy copyright protected designs in the UK, or sell imports copied elsewhere. There are dozens of such firms operating in the UK and hundreds of products.

The total number of prosecutions for copyright offences under the Copyright Designs and Patents Act (CDPA) in 2009 was 753, covering all types of existing copyright applications. We do not know how many actions for design infringement took place, as this is a civil matter, and often settled out of court. There are many importers who could be subject to prosecution if they continue to copy, but the effect of enforcement should be to change their behaviour. Given the importance of the markets covered by the products involved there would inevitably be some infringements to prosecute. It is impossible to estimate what the increase would be, but copying would be relatively easy to spot, as many of the products are sold over the internet. If half of the leading importers were to continue to infringe it could mean up to additional 10 prosecutions per year.

Most of the costs of investigating current infringement cases fall on Trading Standards Authorities. They devote a national average of days per case as follows:
- 85 by middle management Trading Standards Officers followed by
- 44 days of junior grades and
- 29 days by senior officers
This amounts to 0.72 person years of investigation per case (although in the area of copyright infringement this might be less, because of the ease of demonstrating the presence of an infringing product on the market).

At an average cost per person for IP experienced staff, based on IPO's own average staff cost of £41,000 p.a. this would imply an investigation cost to developed case of £29,520

If all these were heard at Magistrates Court, the cost per case of prosecution would be expected to be £2,500 per case. If heard at Crown Court, the cost per case would be expected to be £9250.

A low estimate of prosecution costs in year 1 would therefore be £435,000 (all cases heard in Magistrates' Courts). A high estimate would be £500,250 (all cases heard in Crown Court), but these should be regarded only as illustrative figures, not as firm estimates.

Benefits

Benefits to Business

Designers argue that the effect of s.52 is that it undermines the integrity of the design industry and it may make British companies less willing to support long term investment in areas such as furniture design than their European competitors.

On a separate issue which is outside the scope of this Impact Assessment, ACID (the design membership organisation, Anti Copying in Design) submitted evidence which it argues shows that the lower status given to design rights in the UK compared to other countries leads to barriers to development of design based businesses. (See http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipreview/ipreview-c4e.html

The data shown on registered rights above (page 6), and independent research for IPO, (http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipresearch-designsreport4-201109.pdf) confirms that UK design based firms use registered rights much less than other EU comparators. Removing the exception to copyright protection in section 52 will bring the returns to long lasting designs for UK firms into line with those in the rest of Europe. It may also improve conditions of doing business in the UK and improve the balance of trade for the UK vis a vis the rest of the EU.

UK Producers
Firms producing classic designs which also qualify for copyright protection will benefit from being able to protect their products from unrestrained copying by others. This may not result in much ‘switching’ from low priced copies to high priced originals by consumers, as the gap in price is typically 85%, with the ‘replica’ one sixth of the price of the original (see table above). There may be some marginal gain to UK producers. They may be better able to defend and sustain the high prices they say they need to support better materials and manufacturing techniques, and the training of designers.

In addition it is probable that permitting copyright to be asserted after 25 years will make it more common for licensing of designs to develop. This would develop legal access to popular designs, give the incentive for the right holder to invest in his brand and also make it possible for more reputable (and more likely UK) producers to get access to classic designs and build a sustainable business. The extent of this is impossible to estimate in advance.

Firms producing classic designs will gain from the fact that the quality signals to consumers in their markets will be clearer. The presence of low cost producers making replica products has led to some cases where purchasers’ expectations have not been met. The current Conran exhibition shows clear examples where this has happened, and the overall effect of this can be to reduce the reputation of all suppliers in a market. This has knock-on effects on consumers who may find the impact of ‘fake’ designs is to undermine trust in products supplied by the original designers.

If other areas, such as jewellery are potentially affected, similar considerations are likely to apply. UK jewellery production is a small proportion of trade, and is likely to be in products which depend more heavily on craftsmanship, to appeal to consumers looking for unique products.

Across all sectors which may be affected, it is likely that there will be additional scope for competition through new design, and some additional protection for UK firms whose competitive advantage depends on the creation of long lived design assets. One of the points made to IPO by European producers pressing for change is the large number of UK designers whose work is encouraged by producers elsewhere.

**Designers**
There will be unquantifiable benefits to designers of works which become classics and which have a long life in the market. In addition to benefitting from a longer period over which royalties can be claimed (if designs have not been assigned to producers) classic designers will avoid the risk of having their reputations associated with poor quality replicas which may be unsafe (lamps) or uncomfortable (beds, chairs) to use.

In addition, it is likely that if products in mass markets are less affected by pure price competition in commoditised replicas to classic designs, demand for new designs will grow. This would give rise to additional incentives for producers to engage designers to develop new innovative products (at close to mass market prices) which will give new opportunities for current designers. How much this occurs in the UK, which has a strong design capability, and how much in emerging markets where much manufacturing will take place, is impossible to estimate. But in any event there are likely to be more opportunities for living designers to add value, while reliance of manufacturers on designers no longer living is likely to fall.

**Legal profession**
There will be some additional income to lawyers in setting up licensing agreements and in enforcement actions. It is impossible to quantify this in the private sector, but the costs are reflected in earlier section. Only in criminal enforcement has an attempt been made to make a quantified illustration.

**Consumers**

Buyers of some classic designs may benefit, to an unquantifiable extent, from better assurance in the quality of designed products, and will be less likely to be misled by classic design names attached to inferior copies. In this market classic designs share some of the characteristics of brands.
7. Summary and preferred option with description of implementation plan

Government proposes to repeal 52 of the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 in order to clarify and update UK legislation in line with EU law. This will allow those artistic works which are exploited through an industrial process to be protected for the full term of copyright (life of the creator plus 70 years) instead of the reduced term of 25 years from the end of the year in which the copies were first marketed.

It is proposed to implement the repeal of section 52 with a relatively long commencement period to allow manufacturers to adjust, and to allow distributors and retailers to clear their stock of any products which will, in future, infringe the copyright of artistic works used as classic designs. The Government proposes to consult upon the commencement date.

8. Specific Impact Tests

Small Firms Impact Test
Analysis conducted for the Furniture, Furnishings and Interiors (FFI) industry by the Sector Skills Council and Proskills in 2007 showed that the furniture industry has around 200,000 employees in 20,000 workplaces, so the majority of firms in this industry are small firms. For those firms which develop their own designs or work with recognised designers the measure will provide additional protection and enable them to resist copying by others. However if any of these firms are involved in manufacturing or trading the replicas, they will incur the costs of either switching to a new product or licensing their current one. We have no data to show how many firms fall in either category.

Statutory Equalities Duties
The proposed changes will not have any impact.

Economic impacts

Economic benefits will include:
- Clarification and update of UK legislation in line with EU law on the use of 'artistic' designs used in manufacture, which should encourage the development of the single market on equal terms.
- Enhanced incentives to firms to develop long lasting designs and to maintain their presence in the market.
- Designers whose works qualify as artistic works will be able to avoid the risk of having their reputations associated with poor quality replicas.
- Opportunities for new UK designers to engage in developing new designs in markets which will be less dominated by low quality imports of classics.

Economics costs will include:
- Additional costs to Government from enforcement of extended copyright protection
- Adjustment costs to manufacturers using designs which will fall under copyright if they choose to change their product range.
- Licensing costs to manufacturers using designs which will fall under copyright if they chose to continue with the same product and seek a licensing agreement.
- Reduced choice to consumers as low priced copies of classic designs will have their supply restricted

The overall impact on the UK economy will depend on how far UK producers are able to respond to the additional incentives to develop long lived design assets, and to market them effectively. UK designers' work is used by international producers who already benefit, in other markets, from the protection which this change will bring to the UK. If the balance in the UK is struck as proposed, it may encourage more investment in innovation to exploit new design, aiming at longer term returns.

Where UK manufacturers choose to develop the work of UK designers, the additional licensing costs described above will stay in the UK. If they choose to license designs by international designers, this will represent a loss to the balance of payments.
Reduced availability of cheap imported replicas which have not been authorised by the copyright owner is unlikely, in itself, to affect the overall economy. This is because the most likely outcome for the majority of any affected purchases in this price range is that they will be replaced by alternative imported designs in the same price range.

**Environmental Impacts**
The proposed changes are not expected to have any significant impact.

**Social Impacts**
The proposed changes will not have any impact.

**Sustainable Development**
The proposed changes will not have any impact.

**OIOO Methodology**
As this is a measure to harmonise UK law with EU it does not qualify as in scope.